Online Appendix

This online appendix provides supplementary information on the empirical results presented in the article "Local Power-Sharing Institutions and Inter-religious Violence in Nigeria" by Jonas Bunte and Laura Thaut Vinson. Please note that references to Tables in the article are represented by roman numerals while Figures in the article are referenced with numbers. In contrast, references to Tables and Figures in this appendix are denoted by capitalized letters.

We have evaluated the effect of power-sharing institutions on inter-religious conflict by analyzing quantitative data in multiple ways:

- Across three datasets: Authors' data, ACLED, and GDELT.
- Using six different dependent variables (violent inter-religious clashes, five measures of elite rhetoric).
- Employing three different methods: negative binomial probit, descriptive statistics, and propensity score matching.
- Using two levels of aggregation: individual-level and district-level.
- With and without interaction effects.
- With and without clustered standard errors
- Utilizing multiple model specifications (different sets of control variables).

The results are consistent across the vast majority of these permutations. In sum, the quantitative findings provide robust evidence in favor of our theory that power-sharing institutions have a moderating effect on inter-religious violence.

Contents

1 Full tables

The article presents reduced tables due to space considerations. This section presents the full tables. They include a) the full set of control variables used, and b) all estimations with and without interaction effects. Note that in all cases the results are robust to changes in the model specification.

We primarily rely on the data we collected and coded ourself as well as the ACLED data provided by Raleigh et al. (2010). As an additional robustness test, we replicate our analyses with GDELT data. We recognize that concerns exist regarding the reliability and validity of GDELT data. For example, scholars have pointed out the exponential increase in events coded over time, with a particularly stark upward trend beginning in 2008. This might be a function of newspapers increasingly providing content electronically or changes in the coding algorithm that might permit multiple-counting of events. However, we argue that the data is not compromised for our purposes. The validity of a cross-sectional analysis is less affected by such dynamics, and we focus on the year 2006 that falls outside of the range of potentially affected data. The comparable results across the three datasets reaffirm this perspective.

Table A: Effect of Power-sharing on the number of fights between Christians and Muslims.

	Inter-religious violence (authors data)						ACLED						GDELT					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Power-sharing	-1.345*	-1.046*	-1.322*	-1.037*	-1.300*	-0.939*	-0.531*	-2.283*	-0.549*	-2.300*	-0.426*	-2.025*	-0.918*	-0.399	-0.945*	-0.394	-1.007*	-0.485
	(0.067)	(0.117)	(0.068)	(0.118)	(0.068)	(0.118)	(0.110)	(0.283)	(0.109)	(0.281)	(0.106)	(0.280)	(0.167)	(0.259)	(0.170)	(0.264)	(0.171)	(0.265)
2nd welfare quintile	-0.380*	-0.268*	-0.364*	-0.249*	-0.357*	-0.218*	-0.284*	-0.646*	-0.326*	-0.681*	-0.253*	-0.578*	-1.238*	-1.169*	-1.317*	-1.203*	-1.332*	-1.239*
	(0.083)	(0.094)	(0.084)	(0.095)	(0.084)	(0.095)	(0.128)	(0.143)	(0.127)	(0.142)	(0.126)	(0.141)	(0.197)	(0.221)	(0.204)	(0.226)	(0.206)	(0.229)
3rd welfare quintile	-0.973*	-0.870*	-0.973*	-0.883*	-0.952*	-0.829*	-0.660*	-1.140*	-0.748*	-1.245*	-0.550*	-0.985*	-1.825*	-1.664*	-1.873*	-1.666*	-1.922*	-1.719*
	(0.092)	(0.102)	(0.094)	(0.105)	(0.094)	(0.104)	(0.138)	(0.155)	(0.138)	(0.156)	(0.136)	(0.153)	(0.224)	(0.242)	(0.232)	(0.250)	(0.233)	(0.252)
4th welfare quintile	-0.997*	-0.840*	-1.021*	-0.871*	-1.012*	-0.814*	-0.377*	-0.827*	-0.578*	-1.035*	-0.393*	-0.795*	-1.288*	-0.976*	-1.591*	-1.264*	-1.681*	-1.371*
	(0.089)	(0.101)	(0.091)	(0.104)	(0.091)	(0.104)	(0.134)	(0.152)	(0.136)	(0.155)	(0.133)	(0.151)	(0.209)	(0.231)	(0.226)	(0.247)	(0.227)	(0.248)
5th welfare quintile	-0.698*	-0.565*	-0.707*	-0.583*	-0.644*	-0.483*	-0.297*	-0.762*	-0.619*	-1.088*	-0.347*	-0.758*	-1.135*	-0.774*	-1.505*	-1.114*	-1.552*	-1.167*
	(0.090)	(0.100)	(0.096)	(0.107)	(0.098)	(0.109)	(0.136)	(0.151)	(0.142)	(0.157)	(0.140)	(0.155)	(0.212)	(0.228)	(0.241)	(0.255)	(0.246)	(0.260)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		-0.376		-0.402*		-0.472*		1.996*		1.965*		1.823*		-0.019		-0.160		-0.088
		(0.194)		(0.195)		(0.195)		(0.371)		(0.370)		(0.363)		(0.436)		(0.452)		(0.454)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		-0.315		-0.251		-0.358		2.546*		2.622*		2.308*		-0.226		-0.453		-0.425
		(0.216)		(0.219)		(0.219)		(0.382)		(0.380)		(0.374)		(0.520)		(0.540)		(0.540)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		-0.585*		-0.556*		-0.735*		2.226*		2.232*		2.005*		-1.254*		-1.176*		-1.087*
		(0.199)		(0.200)		(0.202)		(0.357)		(0.355)		(0.349)		(0.485)		(0.492)		(0.494)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		-0.499*		-0.465*		-0.569*		2.376*		2.356*		2.099*		-2.993*		-2.887*		-2.836*
		(0.197)		(0.199)		(0.198)		(0.362)		(0.358)		(0.350)		(0.806)		(0.808)		(0.807)
Total population	-0.007*	-0.007*	-0.006*	-0.007*	-0.007*	-0.007*	0.003*	0.005*	0.003*	0.004*	0.003*	0.004*	0.007*	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*	0.005*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Propensity score (Author's data)	9.166*	9.399*	8.122*	8.326*	8.072*	8.352*												
	(1.622)	(1.632)	(1.648)	(1.657)	(1.638)	(1.650)												
Propensity score (ACLED)							6.402*	5.034*	6.317*	5.207*	6.622*	6.055*						
							(2.464)	(2.514)	(2.423)	(2.477)	(2.323)	(2.380)						
Propensity score (GDELT)													3.521	1.594	3.955	2.112	4.690	3.000
													(2.290)	(2.370)	(2.383)	(2.477)	(2.429)	(2.502)
Education of head of household			0.026	0.026	0.019	0.018			0.193*	0.198*	0.173*	0.178*			0.168*	0.159*	0.178*	0.169*
			(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)			(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)			(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Age of head of household			-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003			0.006	0.006	0.007*	0.007*			0.007	0.007	0.008	0.008
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)			(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Gender of head of household			0.052	0.059	-0.022	-0.019			0.813*	0.807*	0.647*	0.649*			0.240	0.259	0.147	0.161
			(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.138)			(0.166)	(0.165)	(0.155)	(0.156)			(0.307)	(0.309)	(0.308)	(0.308)
Reason for poverty: Lack of adequate land					-0.196	-0.200					-0.226	-0.312					-2.359*	-2.252*
					(0.156)	(0.155)					(0.242)	(0.246)					(0.563)	(0.553)
Reason for poverty: Lack of jobs					-0.079	-0.100					-0.312*	-0.283*					-0.186	-0.207
					(0.091)	(0.091)					(0.132)	(0.133)					(0.215)	(0.213)
Reason for poverty: Hard econmoic times					0.353*	0.381*					0.729*	0.694*					0.251	0.267
					(0.066)	(0.066)					(0.087)	(0.088)					(0.153)	(0.153)
Reason for poverty: Too much competition					0.418*	0.444*					1.322*	1.293*					-0.846*	-0.749
					(0.152)	(0.152)					(0.161)	(0.162)					(0.418)	(0.413)
Reason for poverty: Cultural or religious reasons					-0.182	-0.176					-1.610*	-1.589*					-0.414	-0.453
					(0.238)	(0.237)					(0.618)	(0.628)					(0.542)	(0.529)
Constant	-0.486*	-0.595*	-0.230	-0.357	-0.207	-0.369	-2.941*	-2.720*	-4.179*	-3.969*	-4.534*	-4.342*	-2.550*	-2.462*	-3.224*	-3.164*	-3.123*	-3.073*
	(0.241)	(0.244)	(0.292)	(0.295)	(0.291)	(0.294)	(0.235)	(0.241)	(0.322)	(0.326)	(0.312)	(0.317)	(0.261)	(0.259)	(0.471)	(0.469)	(0.470)	(0.468)
N	6,113	6,113	6,014	6,014	6,014	6,014	6,113	6,113	6,014	6,014	6,014	6,014	6,113	6,113	6,014	6,014	6,014	6,014

Full set of estimation results for the number of fights between Christians and Muslims. Corresponds to Table **??** in the article. * p<0.05.

Table B: Effect of Power-sharing on elite rhetoric.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Power-sharing	2.717*	1.665*	2.717*	1.655*	2.737*	1.640*	2.728*	1.679*
	(0.126)	(0.204)	(0.126)	(0.204)	(0.128)	(0.207)	(0.130)	(0.221)
2nd welfare quintile	-0.568*	-1.072*	-0.594*	-1.097*	-0.506*	-1.020*	-0.556*	-1.036*
	(0.161)	(0.197)	(0.162)	(0.198)	(0.175)	(0.210)	(0.177)	(0.216)
3rd welfare quintile	-0.670*	-1.411*	-0.703*	-1.447*	-0.595*	-1.386*	-0.673*	-1.333*
	(0.169)	(0.211)	(0.170)	(0.212)	(0.184)	(0.224)	(0.191)	(0.231)
4th welfare quintile	-0.454*	-0.866*	-0.488*	-0.899*	-0.372*	-0.825*	-0.628*	-1.056*
	(0.171)	(0.208)	(0.172)	(0.208)	(0.189)	(0.223)	(0.194)	(0.231)
5th welfare quintile	-0.021	-0.552*	-0.059	-0.591*	0.064	-0.518*	-0.052	-0.608*
	(0.173)	(0.205)	(0.174)	(0.205)	(0.193)	(0.221)	(0.206)	(0.239)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		1.481*		1.483*		1.475*		1.392*
		(0.324)		(0.324)		(0.328)		(0.339)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		2.056*		2.069*		2.140*		1.860*
		(0.345)		(0.344)		(0.348)		(0.362)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		1.066*		1.075*		1.130*		1.194*
		(0.318)		(0.317)		(0.321)		(0.338)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		1.471*		1.485*		1.557*		1.463*
		(0.333)		(0.333)		(0.336)		(0.354)
Total population	0.010*	0.011*	0.010*	0.011*	0.011*	0.012*	0.010*	0.011*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Propensity score	-0.330	-0.574	-0.459	-0.648	-0.209	-0.638	-0.221	-0.113
	(1.694)	(1.751)	(1.694)	(1.751)	(1.732)	(1.783)	(1.765)	(1.827)
Reason for poverty: Cultural or religious reasons			-1.158*	-1.231*	-1.085*	-1.168*	-1.053*	-1.139*
			(0.483)	(0.481)	(0.487)	(0.483)	(0.481)	(0.478)
Household owns a radio					0.298	0.279	0.243	0.238
					(0.174)	(0.167)	(0.174)	(0.170)
Education of head of household							0.088*	0.094*
							(0.031)	(0.031)
Gender of head of household							0.689*	0.597*
							(0.245)	(0.249)
Age of head of household							0.005	0.004
							(0.004)	(0.004)
Head of household is employed							0.518*	0.286
							(0.166)	(0.171)
Constant	-2.962*	-2.792*	-2.915*	-2.751*	-3.440*	-3.201*	-4.778*	-4.274*
	(0.348)	(0.364)	(0.349)	(0.364)	(0.471)	(0.469)	(0.582)	(0.591)
N	6,113	6,113	6,113	6,113	6,066	6,066	5,699	5,699

Full set of estimation results for the number of statements that express the intent to cooperate. Corresponds to Models 1, 2, and 3 in Table **??** of the article. * $p<0.05$.

Table C: Effect of Power-sharing on elite rhetoric.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Power-sharing	1.876*	0.606*	1.867*	0.578*	1.896*	0.546*	1.829*	0.491*
	(0.114)	(0.202)	(0.114)	(0.202)	(0.117)	(0.206)	(0.119)	(0.215)
2nd welfare quintile	-0.412*	-1.176*	-0.434*	-1.211*	-0.352	-1.165*	-0.426*	-1.210*
	(0.168)	(0.221)	(0.169)	(0.222)	(0.181)	(0.234)	(0.185)	(0.240)
3rd welfare quintile	-0.402*	-1.497*	-0.426*	-1.537*	-0.326	-1.501*	-0.417*	-1.562*
	(0.167)	(0.231)	(0.168)	(0.232)	(0.182)	(0.243)	(0.188)	(0.252)
4th welfare quintile	-0.276	-0.813*	-0.308	-0.861*	-0.203	-0.817*	-0.523*	-1.125*
	(0.167)	(0.211)	(0.168)	(0.213)	(0.184)	(0.226)	(0.193)	(0.241)
5th welfare quintile	0.070	-0.649*	0.037	-0.700*	0.144	-0.659*	0.002	-0.802*
	(0.165)	(0.206)	(0.166)	(0.208)	(0.184)	(0.223)	(0.195)	(0.238)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		1.810*		1.830*		1.861*		1.823*
		(0.325)		(0.326)		(0.328)		(0.338)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		2.513*		2.541*		2.622*		2.562*
		(0.345)		(0.345)		(0.347)		(0.360)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		1.195*		1.221*		1.296*		1.330*
		(0.308)		(0.309)		(0.311)		(0.330)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		1.689*		1.714*		1.803*		1.730*
		(0.316)		(0.316)		(0.319)		(0.331)
Total population	0.011*	0.014*	0.011*	0.014*	0.012*	0.015*	0.012*	0.014*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Propensity score	31.762*	40.080*	33.393*	42.341*	33.872*	42.338*	35.827*	43.395*
	(11.224)	(11.148)	(11.285)	(11.239)	(11.438)	(11.403)	(11.626)	(11.568)
Reason for poverty: Cultural or religious reasons			-1.318*	-1.494*	-1.291	-1.469*	-1.352*	-1.565*
			(0.659)	(0.657)	(0.659)	(0.657)	(0.662)	(0.659)
Household owns a radio					0.338	0.260	0.203	0.164
					(0.183)	(0.174)	(0.186)	(0.178)
Education of head of household							0.085*	0.108*
							(0.031)	(0.030)
Gender of head of household							0.450	0.315
							(0.244)	(0.248)
Age of head of household							0.006	0.004
							(0.004)	(0.004)
Head of household is employed							0.925*	0.747*
							(0.184)	(0.182)
Constant	-8.129*	-9.183*	-8.349*	-9.494*	-8.962*	-9.906*	-10.635*	-11.076*
	(1.731)	(1.717)	(1.739)	(1.729)	(1.785)	(1.773)	(1.849)	(1.832)
N	6,113	6,113	6,113	6,113	6,066	6,066	5,699	5,699

Full set of estimation results for the number of statements that appeal to others to settle dispute. Corresponds to Models 4, 5, and 6 in Table **??** of the article. * p<0.05.

Table D: Effect of Power-sharing on elite rhetoric.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Power-sharing	2.575*	1.183*	2.569*	1.150*	2.612*	1.139*	2.514*	1.066*
	(0.131)	(0.229)	(0.132)	(0.229)	(0.136)	(0.235)	(0.139)	(0.247)
2nd welfare quintile	-0.662*	-1.587*	-0.688*	-1.630*	-0.562*	-1.556*	-0.623*	-1.572*
	(0.193)	(0.257)	(0.194)	(0.259)	(0.213)	(0.275)	(0.215)	(0.281)
3rd welfare quintile	-0.701*	-1.928*	-0.732*	-1.984*	-0.589*	-1.920*	-0.669*	-1.954*
	(0.193)	(0.261)	(0.193)	(0.262)	(0.214)	(0.279)	(0.220)	(0.289)
4th welfare quintile	-0.700*	-1.408*	-0.734*	-1.455*	-0.588*	-1.384*	-0.927*	-1.705*
	(0.201)	(0.253)	(0.201)	(0.253)	(0.224)	(0.272)	(0.231)	(0.286)
5th welfare quintile	-0.358	-1.212*	-0.400	-1.272*	-0.251	-1.204*	-0.363	-1.323*
	(0.204)	(0.254)	(0.205)	(0.255)	(0.229)	(0.275)	(0.241)	(0.295)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		2.074*		2.106*		2.139*		2.070*
		(0.368)		(0.369)		(0.375)		(0.386)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		2.800*		2.846*		2.925*		2.812*
		(0.389)		(0.389)		(0.395)		(0.406)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		1.357*		1.382*		1.446*		1.486*
		(0.354)		(0.354)		(0.360)		(0.379)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		1.762*		1.797*		1.871*		1.774*
		(0.370)		(0.370)		(0.376)		(0.393)
Total population	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Propensity score	23.291*	27.927*	23.852*	28.654*	24.023*	29.197*	23.971*	28.336*
	(4.831)	(4.972)	(4.843)	(4.988)	(4.941)	(5.104)	(4.995)	(5.144)
Reason for poverty: Cultural or religious reasons			-1.269*	-1.649*	-1.200*	-1.617*	-1.212*	-1.603*
			(0.610)	(0.646)	(0.610)	(0.653)	(0.606)	(0.640)
Household owns a radio					0.415	0.335	0.227	0.159
					(0.218)	(0.203)	(0.221)	(0.209)
Education of head of household							0.092*	0.119*
							(0.034)	(0.034)
Gender of head of household							0.645*	0.504
							(0.266)	(0.272)
Age of head of household							0.010*	0.007
							(0.005)	(0.005)
Head of household is employed							1.007*	0.836*
							(0.196)	(0.196)
Constant	-5.787*	-5.817*	-5.787*	-5.816*	-6.464*	-6.379*	-8.217*	-7.691*
	(0.299)	(0.304)	(0.299)	(0.304)	(0.470)	(0.461)	(0.634)	(0.620)
N	6,113	6,113	6,113	6,113	6,066	6,066	5,699	5,699

Full set of estimation results for the number of statements that express the intent to meet or negotiate. Corresponds to Models 7, 8, and 9 in Table **??** of the article. * p<0.05.

Table E: Effect of Power-sharing on elite rhetoric.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Power-sharing	2.668*	1.546*	2.657*	1.537*	2.706*	1.549*	2.573*	1.466*
	(0.112)	(0.171)	(0.113)	(0.171)	(0.114)	(0.174)	(0.114)	(0.178)
2nd welfare quintile	-0.435*	-0.824*	-0.426*	-0.811*	-0.320*	-0.732*	-0.367*	-0.810*
	(0.118)	(0.140)	(0.118)	(0.141)	(0.127)	(0.149)	(0.129)	(0.153)
3rd welfare quintile	-0.765*	-1.428*	-0.766*	-1.429*	-0.667*	-1.358*	-0.645*	-1.414*
	(0.124)	(0.148)	(0.124)	(0.148)	(0.133)	(0.156)	(0.136)	(0.163)
4th welfare quintile	-0.718*	-1.077*	-0.719*	-1.079*	-0.614*	-0.997*	-0.876*	-1.223*
	(0.123)	(0.149)	(0.123)	(0.149)	(0.133)	(0.159)	(0.136)	(0.165)
5th welfare quintile	-0.509*	-0.938*	-0.510*	-0.939*	-0.406*	-0.860*	-0.588*	-1.051*
	(0.124)	(0.148)	(0.124)	(0.148)	(0.135)	(0.158)	(0.146)	(0.173)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		1.367*		1.353*		1.401*		1.422*
		(0.244)		(0.245)		(0.247)		(0.252)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		2.033*		2.034*		2.077*		2.188*
		(0.258)		(0.258)		(0.259)		(0.267)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		1.147*		1.149*		1.177*		1.019*
		(0.238)		(0.238)		(0.239)		(0.246)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		1.363*		1.365*		1.397*		1.230*
		(0.247)		(0.247)		(0.248)		(0.259)
Total population	0.105*	0.107*	0.105*	0.106*	0.107*	0.108*	0.107*	0.109*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Propensity score	95.279*	96.502*	94.884*	96.103*	96.566*	97.891*	97.130*	98.399*
	(5.579)	(5.529)	(5.587)	(5.539)	(5.613)	(5.569)	(5.750)	(5.644)
Reason for poverty: Cultural or religious reasons			-0.336	-0.335	-0.427	-0.424	-0.459	-0.408
			(0.367)	(0.375)	(0.365)	(0.373)	(0.369)	(0.379)
Household owns a radio					0.330*	0.292*	0.230	0.201
					(0.130)	(0.126)	(0.132)	(0.128)
Education of head of household							0.112*	0.139*
							(0.023)	(0.023)
Gender of head of household							0.026	-0.094
							(0.193)	(0.195)
Age of head of household							0.012*	0.011*
							(0.003)	(0.003)
Head of household is employed							1.107*	0.991*
							(0.134)	(0.135)
Constant	-55.403*	-55.920*	-55.173*	-55.689*	-56.652*	-57.158*	-58.532*	-58.736*
	(3.166)	(3.138)	(3.171)	(3.144)	(3.197)	(3.173)	(3.301)	(3.241)
N	6,113	6,113	6,113	6,113	6,066	6,066	5,699	5,699

Full set of estimation results for the number of statements that report a visit. Corresponds to Models 10, 11, and 12 in Table **??** of the article. * p<0.05.

Table F: Effect of Power-sharing on elite rhetoric.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Power-sharing	2.421*	1.100*	2.416*	1.051*	2.479*	1.083*	2.408*	1.000*
	(0.119)	(0.219)	(0.119)	(0.219)	(0.121)	(0.226)	(0.125)	(0.232)
2nd welfare quintile	-0.475*	-0.980*	-0.522*	-1.038*	-0.357	-0.923*	-0.413*	-0.984*
	(0.172)	(0.200)	(0.173)	(0.201)	(0.184)	(0.212)	(0.189)	(0.219)
3rd welfare quintile	-0.673*	-1.402*	-0.726*	-1.476*	-0.545*	-1.363*	-0.567*	-1.413*
	(0.184)	(0.223)	(0.185)	(0.224)	(0.198)	(0.237)	(0.207)	(0.247)
4th welfare quintile	-0.297	-0.824*	-0.360	-0.904*	-0.147	-0.764*	-0.485*	-1.107*
	(0.195)	(0.230)	(0.197)	(0.231)	(0.213)	(0.248)	(0.224)	(0.260)
5th welfare quintile	0.014	-0.615*	-0.050	-0.697*	0.173	-0.553*	-0.066	-0.864*
	(0.196)	(0.230)	(0.198)	(0.231)	(0.215)	(0.249)	(0.239)	(0.282)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		1.649*		1.688*		1.689*		1.707*
		(0.342)		(0.341)		(0.344)		(0.352)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		2.155*		2.213*		2.235*		2.322*
		(0.369)		(0.369)		(0.371)		(0.380)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		1.395*		1.446*		1.454*		1.492*
		(0.335)		(0.334)		(0.337)		(0.351)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		1.733*		1.786*		1.802*		1.834*
		(0.351)		(0.351)		(0.353)		(0.373)
Total population	0.011*	0.011*	0.011*	0.011*	0.011*	0.011*	0.011*	0.010*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Propensity score	5.770*	4.196*	5.462*	3.909*	5.934*	4.062*	5.343*	3.800*
	(1.474)	(1.462)	(1.476)	(1.459)	(1.494)	(1.471)	(1.556)	(1.531)
Reason for poverty: Cultural or religious reasons			-1.323*	-1.604*	-1.118*	-1.469*	-1.271*	-1.632*
			(0.483)	(0.483)	(0.492)	(0.489)	(0.488)	(0.485)
Household owns a radio					0.497*	0.374*	0.410*	0.328
					(0.178)	(0.173)	(0.180)	(0.174)
Education of head of household							0.137*	0.163*
							(0.033)	(0.033)
Gender of head of household							0.266	0.199
							(0.266)	(0.266)
Age of head of household							0.009*	0.008
							(0.004)	(0.004)
Head of household is employed							0.785*	0.576*
							(0.182)	(0.187)
Constant	-3.450*	-2.709*	-3.306*	-2.557*	-4.303*	-3.228*	-5.411*	-4.210*
	(0.570)	(0.573)	(0.572)	(0.573)	(0.681)	(0.669)	(0.779)	(0.782)
N	6,113	6,113	6,113	6,113	6,066	6,066	5,699	5,699

Full set of estimation results for the number of statements that report engagement in diplomatic cooperation. Corresponds to Models 13, 14, and 15 in Table **??** of the article. * $p<0.05$.

Table G: Effect of Power-sharing on individual-level perceptions.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Power-sharing	-1.991*	-2.335*	-2.048*	-2.394*	-1.897*	-2.260*	-1.795*	-2.228*
	(0.328)	(0.596)	(0.329)	(0.597)	(0.331)	(0.600)	(0.334)	(0.602)
2nd welfare quintile	0.241	0.255	0.132	0.144	-0.045	-0.033	-0.313	-0.305
	(0.195)	(0.198)	(0.199)	(0.203)	(0.213)	(0.217)	(0.225)	(0.230)
3rd welfare quintile	-0.763*	-0.841*	-0.925*	-1.016*	-1.060*	-1.155*	-1.311*	-1.404*
	(0.264)	(0.275)	(0.272)	(0.283)	(0.281)	(0.293)	(0.293)	(0.305)
4th welfare quintile	-0.768*	-0.825*	-0.967*	-1.028*	-1.129*	-1.188*	-1.438*	-1.496*
	(0.268)	(0.278)	(0.277)	(0.287)	(0.287)	(0.298)	(0.307)	(0.318)
5th welfare quintile	-1.080*	-1.180*	-1.493*	-1.605*	-1.753*	-1.872*	-2.226*	-2.338*
	(0.296)	(0.309)	(0.310)	(0.323)	(0.330)	(0.345)	(0.378)	(0.391)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		-0.768		-0.793		-0.728		-0.556
		(1.173)		(1.175)		(1.178)		(1.180)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		1.197		1.362		1.359		1.392
		(0.955)		(0.958)		(0.963)		(0.965)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		0.816		0.756		0.713		0.834
		(0.954)		(0.956)		(0.958)		(0.962)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		1.425		1.457		1.475		1.490
		(0.961)		(0.964)		(0.969)		(0.976)
Total population	0.016	0.023	-0.013	-0.004	0.089	0.100	-0.000	0.011
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.097)	(0.097)
Propensity score (Competition)	14.940	15.323	17.263	17.428	6.809	7.021	14.054	14.986
	(12.145)	(12.208)	(12.430)	(12.516)	(13.288)	(13.393)	(14.032)	(14.184)
Age of head of household			-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.010	-0.010	-0.014*	-0.015*
			(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Education of head of household			0.231*	0.233*	0.253*	0.256*	0.237*	0.240*
			(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.049)
Gender of head of household			0.100	0.107	-0.009	0.000	0.101	0.092
			(0.356)	(0.357)	(0.371)	(0.372)	(0.385)	(0.386)
Head of household is married			-0.671*	-0.661*	-0.732*	-0.720*	-0.658*	-0.652*
			(0.232)	(0.233)	(0.242)	(0.243)	(0.251)	(0.252)
Head of household is employed					1.216*	1.211*	1.126*	1.114*
					(0.397)	(0.398)	(0.400)	(0.401)
Household has food problems					0.175	0.186	0.095	0.110
					(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.169)	(0.169)
Household owns a TV							-1.468*	-1.457*
							(0.238)	(0.238)
Household owns a mobile phone							0.754*	0.744*
							(0.333)	(0.333)
Household owns a radio							-0.778*	-0.780*
							(0.298)	(0.298)
Household owns a motorcycle							0.164	0.184
							(0.227)	(0.229)
Household owns a vehicle							1.268	1.264
							(0.740)	(0.741)
Household owns a house							0.405	0.404
							(0.226)	(0.227)
Constant	-3.352*	-3.357*	-2.523*	-2.530*	-3.710*	-3.721*	-4.364*	-4.408*
	(0.476)	(0.479)	(0.590)	(0.593)	(0.721)	(0.724)	(1.161)	(1.166)
N	6,113	6,113	6,014	6,014	5,685	5,685	5,457	5,457

Full set of estimation results for the degree to which individuals experience competition. Corresponds to Models 1, 2, and 3 in Table **??** of the article. * p<0.05.

Table H: Effect of Power-sharing on individual-level perceptions.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Power-sharing	0.303*	-0.322	0.289*	-0.396	0.315*	-0.245	0.431*	-0.210
	(0.094)	(0.307)	(0.096)	(0.308)	(0.100)	(0.334)	(0.104)	(0.334)
2nd welfare quintile	-0.064	-0.210	-0.105	-0.264	0.093	-0.035	-0.010	-0.178
	(0.198)	(0.230)	(0.199)	(0.231)	(0.218)	(0.259)	(0.224)	(0.265)
3rd welfare quintile	0.514*	0.363	0.431*	0.223	0.559*	0.379	0.327	0.108
	(0.180)	(0.206)	(0.182)	(0.209)	(0.206)	(0.242)	(0.215)	(0.252)
4th welfare quintile	0.943*	0.629*	0.829*	0.487*	1.028*	0.714*	0.773*	0.382
	(0.169)	(0.199)	(0.171)	(0.203)	(0.193)	(0.233)	(0.204)	(0.245)
5th welfare quintile	1.645*	1.437*	1.436*	1.201*	1.590*	1.371*	1.079*	0.827*
	(0.166)	(0.188)	(0.169)	(0.193)	(0.194)	(0.226)	(0.221)	(0.249)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		0.428		0.445		0.273		0.368
		(0.443)		(0.445)		(0.466)		(0.467)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		0.412		0.605		0.433		0.525
		(0.407)		(0.409)		(0.439)		(0.442)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		0.928*		0.982*		0.821*		0.988*
		(0.350)		(0.353)		(0.377)		(0.380)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		0.669*		0.726*		0.600		0.640
		(0.341)		(0.343)		(0.368)		(0.372)
Total population	-0.004	-0.001	-0.002	0.001	-0.025	-0.022	-0.169*	-0.166*
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Propensity score (Police)	6.879*	6.781*	6.433*	6.372*	6.453*	6.385*	6.296*	6.248*
	(0.869)	(0.869)	(0.875)	(0.876)	(0.931)	(0.934)	(0.997)	(1.000)
Age of head of household			-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004
			(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education of head of household			0.163*	0.163*	0.192*	0.191*	0.111*	0.110*
			(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Gender of head of household			-0.236	-0.211	-0.100	-0.073	-0.008	0.014
			(0.250)	(0.251)	(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.267)	(0.267)
Head of household is married			-0.240	-0.230	-0.106	-0.092	-0.072	-0.059
			(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.171)	(0.171)
Head of household is employed					-0.368*	-0.386*	-0.368*	-0.387*
					(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.145)	(0.145)
Household has food problems					-0.136	-0.136	-0.120	-0.119
					(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.098)	(0.098)
Household owns a TV							-0.633*	-0.642*
							(0.122)	(0.122)
Household owns a mobile phone							0.062	0.058
							(0.133)	(0.133)
Household owns a radio							-0.243	-0.231
							(0.208)	(0.208)
Household owns a motorcycle							-0.461*	-0.474*
							(0.103)	(0.104)
Household owns a vehicle							-0.079	-0.088
							(0.160)	(0.161)
Household owns a house							-0.374*	-0.367*
							(0.120)	(0.120)
Constant	-3.832*	-3.627*	-3.686*	-3.461*	-3.625*	-3.396*	-1.825*	-1.524*
	(0.178)	(0.191)	(0.265)	(0.273)	(0.307)	(0.323)	(0.438)	(0.452)
N	5,982	5,982	5,892	5,892	5,570	5,570	5,370	5,370

Full set of estimation results for the degree to which individuals perceive police services as improved. Corresponds to Models 4, 5, and 6 in Table **??** of the article. * $p<0.05$.

2 Full graphs

Similarly, space considerations prevented us from presenting visual representations of the results for all models reported in the article. For this reason, Figures **??**, **??**, and **??** in the article visualize the results of the most comprehensive models with the largest number of control variables. However, to demonstrate that the substantive effects are robust across the various model specifications shown in the article, this section presents graphical representations of all models reported in Tables **??**, **??**, and **??**.



Figure A: Predicted number of fights between Christians and Muslims. Visualizations of all models presented in Table **??** of the article.



Figure B: Predicted number of respective public statements by Christians and Muslim leaders. Visualizations of all models presented in Table **??** of the article.



Figure C: Perceptions of the general population. Visualizations of all models presented in Table **??** of the article.

3 Visual representation of results

The interpretation of numerical results presented in Tables **??**, **??**, and **??** is challenging as they involve interaction effects. To facilitate interpretation, the article presents Figures **??**, **??**, and **??** that illustrate the predicted differences in the outcomes conditional on the presence or absence of power-sharing institutions.

However, there are two ways in which numerical results can be represented visually: The *prediction at the average of the covariates* and the *average of the predictions*. The first option calculates the expected count for a person with average characteristics based on the negative binomial regressions reported in the article. That is, the predicted count is calculated for a person that might be 0.76 female and owns 1.2 radios. The second option calculates the average count based on the actual characteristics of the observations in the data. This approach first calculates the expected count while treating all observations as if they were located in districts with power-sharing institutions, and then treating all observations as if they were located in districts without power-sharing institutions.

Conceptually, the prediction at the average of the covariates is different from the average of the predictions. We find interpreting the approach focusing on the average of the predictions more intuitive. Figures **??**, **??**, and **??** were created using this approach. However, the interpretation of the results is not dependent on which approach is used. Figures D, E, and F compare the predicted outcomes for Table **??** of the article. The predictions calculated at the average of covariates are created by holding all covariates at their mean. As can be seen, the substantive interpretation is identical across these two approaches.



Figure D: Predicted number of fights between Christians and Muslims for two different approaches of calculating predicted outcomes. Based models 1, 2, and 3 of Table **??** which utilize the Authors' data.



Figure E: Predicted number of fights between Christians and Muslims for two different approaches of calculating predicted outcomes. Based models 4, 5, and 6 of Table **??** which utilize the ACLED data.



Figure F: Predicted number of fights between Christians and Muslims for two different approaches of calculating predicted outcomes. Based models 7, 8, and 9 of Table **??** which utilize the GDELT data.

4 Endogeneity

Endogeneity is a concern with respect to our analysis. Some districts might have been historically more peaceful than others and these conditions might have facilitated the development of power-sharing in the first place. In this case, we would falsely attribute causal power to power-sharing institutions when they are in fact outcomes of, not reasons for, peace.

To investigate this possibility, Table I presents data obtained from the Social, Political, and Economic Event Database Project (SPEED) database. If reverse causality were an issue, we would expect a distinct pattern in the data: districts without power-sharing today should be characterized by much violence, while the historical pattern in districts with power-sharing today should be distinctively peaceful. We use data from 1955-1985, thereby ending the analysis around the time the first power-sharing agreements were introduced.

First, we obtain data on "politically motivated attacks," which are defined as physical acts of violence perpetrated by humans with the intent to inflict damage on the person or property of others for *political* reasons. Political reasons explicitly include "attackers driven by hatred toward different socio-cultural groups (racial, nationality, religious, etc.)" (Cline Center for Democracy, 2013: p.7). The left panel of Table I displays the incidences of violent political attacks over time across districts with and without power-sharing. The absence of a clearly distinct pattern between the two types of districts is telling: Neither type of district was historically likely to experience these types of attacks.

Mirroring our own empirical strategy, we attempt to find data on political expressions that might indicate a systematic difference in rhetoric across districts with and without power-sharing. The SPEED data provides data on political expressions that are defined as the public articulation of a *political* message. Political messages are defined as "messages about the make-up of the social system, the structure and operation of the economic

system, and cultural mores that bear on how individuals live their lives (religion, family life, community life, etc.) [...] these messages must be threatening to societal elites and/or prevailing societal equilibria" (Cline Center for Democracy, 2013: p.2). While this definition is different from the data we were able to use in the article, it clearly resembles the phenomenon we intend to capture. The right panel of Table I shows that there is no difference in the pattern of threatening political expressions across districts with and without power-sharing. Such expressions are equally unlikely in either type of district.

In sum, therefore, quantitative historical data alleviates concerns about endogeneity.

Table I: Historical violence across districts with and without Power-sharing today.

	LGA	Violent political attacks				Total	Threatening political expressions				Total
		1955-1965	1965-1975	1975-1985	1985-1995	1955-1985	1955-1965	1965-1975	1975-1985	1985-1995	1955-1985
No Power-sharing	Barkin Ladi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Giwa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Igabi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Ikara	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Jaba	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Jema'a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Jos East	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Jos North	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Jos South	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Kaduna North	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Kaduna South	0	2	0	2	4	0	1	0	0	1
	Kagarko	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Kanke	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Kauru	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Kubau	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Kudan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Langtang North	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Lere	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Makarfi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Qua'anpa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Riyom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sabon-Ga	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Shendam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Soba	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Wase	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ZangonKa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Zaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Power-sharing	Bassa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Birnin-G	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Bokkos	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Chikun	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Kachia	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	Kajuru	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
	Kanam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Kaura	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Mangu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Pankshin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sanga	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Number of incidences pertaining to either verbal or actual political violence in provinces across Kaduna and Plateau state as well as across time. Data show that provinces with power-sharing agreements today were not less violent to begin with in comparison to provinces that are characterized by a lack of power-sharing agreements today.

5 Selection bias

Selection bias is an additional concern with respect to our analysis. As we are working with observational data it is possible that the characteristics of districts without power-sharing arrangements might fundamentally differ from those with power-sharing institutions. In this case, the 'treatment' of power-sharing institutions is not randomly assigned to districts. The differences in the outcomes across districts with and without power-sharing institutions might therefore not stem from the presence or absence of these institutions but from the differences in the overall characteristics of these districts. We would falsely attribute causality to power-sharing institutions.

Propensity Score Matching is of the most prominent approached to address selection bias (Ho et al., 2007). The idea is to restrict the sample to comparable observations. This approach 'matches' two districts whose characteristics are as similar as possible, but only one district has power-sharing institutions while the other has not. In this case, the differences in the outcome across the two districts cannot be attributed to differences in their characteristics (because they are similar). Instead, the differences in the outcome are related to whether or not the district has received the 'treatment' (i.e. presence or absence of power-sharing institutions).

The quantity of interest is therefore the difference in outcomes across a treatment and a control observations, who are as similar as possible but differ in whether or not they have power-sharing institutions. To identify the effect of the treatment on the outcome we follow Abadie & Imbens (2006) and calculate the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) with

$$ATE \equiv \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|X_i]$$

This quantity is the mean causal effect for a unit whose characteristics are represented by X_i, averaged over all units (Ho et al., 2007: p.6).

We re-estimate the effect of power-sharing institutions on the overall degree of inter-religious violence using propensity score matching on the sample restricted to comparable observations. Note that matching approaches do not allow for interactions between the treatment variables with control variables. We therefore re-estimate models (1), (3), (7), (9), (13), and (15) of Table A as these do not include interaction effects.

Table J presents the Average Treatment Effect of power-sharing on the number of violent events between Christians and Muslims. Using the individual-level data, power-sharing institutions have a negative and statistically significant effect on the overall degree of inter-religious violence regardless of the dataset used. The ATEs of the aggregated analysis on the district level with only 38 observations also show that power-sharing institutions are associated with a decline in inter-religious violence, with a magnitude that is comparable to the ATEs of the individual-level analysis. However, it is statistically significant only for the Author's dataset. Considering the data quality of both ACLED and GDELT with respect to district-level information on inter-religious violence, the different ATEs across datasets with only 38 observations is not surprising. Taken together, the estimates using propensity score matching show that power-sharing institutions lower the number of violent clashes between Christians and Muslims.

We also re-estimate the effect of power-sharing institutions on the rhetoric of religious elites. Again, the use of matching techniques prevents the inclusion of interaction effects, but we include the full set of control variables. The Average Treatment Effects of power-sharing on different types of cooperative statements and events by religious leaders are presented in Table K. Power-sharing institutions have a positive effect degree to which

Table J: Effect of Power-sharing on the number of fights between Christians and Muslims.

Data		Disaggregated			Aggregate mean		
		N	ATE	p-value	N	ATE	p-value
GDELT	no controls	6,113	-0.179	0.000	38	-0.289	0.209
	$individual	6,014	-0.135	0.000	38	-0.289	0.220
ACLED	no controls	6,113	-0.135	0.000	38	0.184	0.517
	$individual	6,014	-0.200	0.000	38	-0.132	0.380
Author's data	no controls	6,113	-1.295	0.000	38	-1.658	0.029
	$individual	6,014	-1.251	0.000	38	-1.316	0.076

Average Treatment Effect (ATE) of power-sharing on the number of violent events between Christians and Muslims. Power-sharing institutions have a negative and statistically significant effect on the overall degree of inter-religious violence.

religious elites use conciliatory language. The positive ATE indicates that leaders in districted with power-sharing institutions are more often cited with statements that a) Express intent to cooperate, b) Appeal to others to settle dispute, c) Express intent to meet or negotiate, d) Make a visit, and e) Engage in Diplomatic Cooperation. The analysis on the individual level is statistically significant across all five dependent variables, while this is the case for only two of the five dependent variables with the district-level analysis where statistical significance is evaluated at the 10% level due to the low number of observations. Taken together, the estimates using propensity score matching show that power-sharing institutions have a positive effect on the number of conciliatory statements by religious leaders.

Table K: Effect of Power-sharing on elite rhetoric.

	Disaggregated			Aggregate mean		
	N	ATE	p-value	N	ATE	p-value
Express intent to cooperate	5,850	2.358	0.000	38	3.974	0.128
Appeal to others to settle dispute	5,850	0.421	0.000	38	0.737	0.082
Express intent to meet or negotiate	5,850	0.947	0.000	38	1.816	0.204
Make a visit	5,850	2.555	0.000	38	4.895	0.185
Engage in Diplomatic Cooperation	5,850	7.253	0.000	38	11.526	0.052

Average Treatment Effect (ATE) of power-sharing on the number of cooperative statements and events by religious leaders. Power-sharing institutions have a positive effect degree to which religious elites use conciliatory language.

6 Estimation at the district level

The dependent variable and the independent variable of interest in Tables **??** and **??** are measured at the district level and combined with information on the individual level. The analyses might therefore overstate the precision of the estimates. This problem, however, is conditional on the distribution of observations on the dependent variable: If instances of violence are concentrated in few districts, the precision of estimates might be overly precise. However, if violent incidences are widely dispersed across districts (and only differ in their frequency) the analyses might underestimate the precision. In either case, instead of duplicating districts by reporting an estimation at the individual level, it is reasonable to also estimate the relationship between power-sharing and conflict events at the district level.

Our dataset provides data on 38 districts. As such, a district-level analysis requires re-estimating the models on 38 observations only. For this reason, three caveats are in order before presenting the results. First, a small sample size precludes statistical significance as only very large effects could be statistically significant. A p-value of 0.05 for a sample size of 20 is not the same as a p-value of 0.05 for a sample of size 2000. To account for this, scholars regularly utilize 0.1 as the threshold by which to judge statistical significance or 90% confidence intervals. Second, (frequentist) statistical techniques require certain statistical assumptions to be met to be applicable. A sample size of 38 might not be sufficient to test for normality, as the power to test normality typically requires hundreds of observations. Furthermore, we utilize count data that is non-normal (hence the negative binomial methodology). If the data are non-normal and the sample size is small, the t-tests are inappropriate. Thus, even if the p-value was 'significant,' the test of the assumptions is not possible which undermines the credibility of the p-values. Third, when the sample size is small, the deletion of a single observation can often reverse the findings. For example, a previously significant result would not be significant anymore after the removal of an

observation, or vice versa. Results based on small sample sizes are therefore 'fragile.' In this case, the analysis of summary statistics might be a more credible alternative.

Considering these caveats, a trade-off exists: We can either estimate the models on the individual level (and possibly overstating the precision of the estimates) or estimate the models on the district level (and possibly obtaining inappropriate estimates). Faced with this trade-off, we pursued the three-pronged strategy. First, considering the distribution of events in our dataset we do not believe that the individual-level models overstate the precision of the estimates. We therefore present these findings in the article. Second, we aggregate the individual level data to obtain district-level averages. We then estimate the models presented in Tables **??** and **??** on the district-level and present them in Tables L and N. Despite the caveats of small-sample regressions mentioned above, it is important to examine whether the findings of both approaches are consistent. Lastly, we present summary statistics of the various outcome variables across districts with and without power-sharing in Tables M and O. These descriptive statistics allow for evaluating the hypotheses independently of modeling assumptions. Consistent results across these three approaches would increase the confidence in the findings.

Overall level of violence The numerical results of the district-level estimates are presented in Table L. As predicted by the first caveat, achieving statistical significance is challenging with only 38 observations. However, the statistical significance of coefficients in models with interaction terms have only limited value as the effect of one variable on the outcome is conditional on the level of the second variable. For this reason, a visual representation of the effects is shown in Figure G. The district-level results are consistent with the individual-level findings for both the Authors' data and the ACLED dataset: Districts without power-sharing institutions have a statistically significant and positive predicted number of violent clashes between Christians and Muslims. In contrast, districts

with power-sharing institutions experience non-significant level of inter-religious violence. The point estimates are consistent with this interpretation when using the GDELT data (i.e. higher in districts without than with power-sharing), but not statistically significant.

However, as indicated above, the small sample and non-normality of the data might imply that the statistical techniques are possibly inappropriate. Instead, summary statistics can allow for evaluation of the data unaffected by methodological issues. Table M presents the descriptive statistics concerning the number of events involving inter-religious violence. The statistics are consistent across three different datasets: The average number of violent inter-religious clashes is higher in district without power-sharing as compared to districts with these institutions.

Elite rhetoric We also re-estimate the models presented in Table **??** of the article concerning the rhetoric of elites. The numerical results are presented in Table N and their visual interpretation in Figure H. The point estimates across the five dependent variables are consistent with the individual-level findings: The number of statements by religious elites that concern the intention to meet or negotiate, appeals to others to settle disputes, the intention to cooperate, announcing visits, or engaging in diplomatic cooperation are higher in districts with than without power-sharing institutions. However, considering the data quality of the GDELT dataset it is not surprising that these findings are not statistically different from zero.

The discussion of caveats above identified that small sample sizes and non-normality of the data might undermine regression approaches. Instead, summary statistics might allow for evaluating the data in an unfiltered manner. Table O presents the descriptive statistics concerning the number of events across five dependent variables by type of district. While the maximum number of events does not differ significantly across districts with and without power-sharing, the average number of events does. Elites in districts

with power-sharing institutions are characterized by a higher average number of cooperative statements by either Christian or Muslim leaders. This is the case across all five dependent variables.

Table L: Effect of Power-sharing on the number of fights between Christians and Muslims.

	Inter-religious violence (authors' data)			ACLED			GDELT		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Power-sharing	-1.119	-0.119	4.897	-0.318	-14.887	-20.724	-1.643	197.969	3.910
	(0.818)	(2.897)	(3.032)	(1.538)	(19.432)	(21.701)	(3.827)	(28412.197)	(18.369)
Welfare quintile	-2.198*	-2.051*	-2.771*	-0.385	-1.487	-5.923	-3.526	-6.120	-1.422
	(0.867)	(0.930)	(0.866)	(1.162)	(1.353)	(7.012)	(4.854)	(5.258)	(2.513)
Power-sharing * Welfare quintile		-0.390	-1.902		4.675	7.581		-121.469	-3.345
		(1.090)	(1.100)		(5.918)	(8.134)		(18982.804)	(11.457)
Total population	-0.119	-0.115	-0.240*	-0.003	0.014	0.033	0.032	0.041	-0.006
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.066)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.055)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.039)
Propensity score (authors' data)	142.845*	138.503*	279.674*						
	(69.955)	(68.792)	(75.659)						
Propensity score (ACLED)				45.835	-8.970	-93.534			
				(99.309)	(93.601)	(172.672)			
Propensity score (GDELT)							-14.643	-399.668	10.730
							(122.728)	(363.771)	(.)
Education of head of household			0.700			2.438			0.609
			(0.551)			(2.210)			(1.457)
Age of head of household			-0.125			0.505			0.028
			(0.130)			(0.443)			(0.448)
Gender of head of household			-27.937*			49.189			1.748
			(12.436)			(55.870)			(88.153)
Reason for poverty: Lack of adequate land			-1.410			-81.330			-132.015
			(10.878)			(79.370)			(160.797)
Reason for poverty: Lack of jobs			-10.506*			-28.868			-16.371
			(5.060)			(31.533)			(19.457)
Reason for poverty: Hard economic times			3.909			-2.797			9.826
			(3.863)			(17.730)			(24.262)
Reason for poverty: Too much competition			6.775			1.901			-25.190
			(8.775)			(13.554)			(68.586)
Reason for poverty: Cultural or religious reasons			4.707			-37.786			-6.805
			(10.495)			(39.009)			(56.208)
Constant	-16.376	-16.074	-2.620	-5.631	0.361	-56.060	1.216	35.020	0.054
	(9.044)	(8.838)	(11.725)	(9.079)	(8.813)	(46.236)	(12.881)	(33.043)	(80.788)
N	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38

Estimation results for number of fights between Christians and Muslims. * p<0.05, Standard Errors in parentheses.



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

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

Data: GDELT

Figure G: Predicted number of fights between Christians and Muslims in districts with and without power-sharing institutions. Results based on models 2, 5, and 8 of Table L.

Table M: Effect of Power-sharing on the number of fights between Christians and Muslims.

		Obs	Mean	Min	Max
GDELT	Power-sharing	11	0.09	0	1
	No Power-sharing	27	0.26	0	5
ACLED	Power-sharing	11	0.09	0	1
	No Power-sharing	27	0.30	0	3
Authors' data	Power-sharing	11	0.55	0	5
	No Power-sharing	27	1.85	0	12

Descriptive statistics for the number of violent clashes between Christians and Muslims across 38 Nigerian districts.

Table N: Effect of Power-sharing on elite rhetoric.

	Express intent to cooperate			Appeal to others to settle dispute			Express intent to meet or negotiate			Make a visit			Engage in diplomatic cooperation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Power-sharing	1.352	-2.402	-3.038	1.549	-8.687	-56.275	2.675	-14.470	7.119	2.761	-4.876	9.087	3.180	-1.126	43.467
	(2.866)	(6.594)	(18.401)	(1.384)	(11.113)	(1407.336)	(1.846)	(13.300)	(16.126)	(1.468)	(5.083)	(11.461)	(1.756)	(7.961)	(39.019)
Welfare quintile	1.404	0.631	-0.825	0.293	-1.464	11.151	-1.076	-3.961	0.789	-0.606	-1.057	1.953	5.214	-0.601	17.263
	(2.823)	(2.994)	(3.640)	(1.534)	(2.596)	(156.133)	(2.767)	(3.785)	(4.977)	(1.044)	(1.051)	(2.426)	(3.128)	(1.846)	(10.660)
Power-sharing * Welfare quintile		1.489	1.806		3.528	43.768		5.990	-0.787		2.640	-2.198		1.175	-10.295
		(2.431)	(6.290)		(3.803)	(564.267)		(4.719)	(5.682)		(1.853)	(3.625)		(2.929)	(11.412)
Total population	0.001	0.006	0.007	0.029	0.071	9.052*	-0.034	-0.052	-0.120	0.122	0.137	0.083	0.125*	0.009	0.230
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.076)	(0.103)	(2.074)	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.181)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.094)	(0.061)	(0.015)	(0.121)
Propensity score (Intent)	57.851	60.923	-6.970												
	(127.095)	(124.220)	(.)												
Propensity score (Appeal)				129.346	298.273	43656.383									
				(370.744)	(480.498)	(.)									
Propensity score (Meet)							153.081	257.353	470.644						
							(213.398)	(243.303)	(611.822)						
Propensity score (Visit)										108.826	121.138	75.212			
										(73.747)	(75.731)	(86.792)			
Propensity score (Cooperate)													231.140*	-3.113	375.265
													(117.055)	(.)	(199.818)
Reason for poverty: Cultural or religious reasons			-51.992			-781.409			-32.708			-7.449			-185.969
			(100.776)			(13845.673)			(60.140)			(23.195)			(154.434)
Household owns a radio			6.179			846.195			39.214			18.887			82.509
			(15.432)			(2111.965)			(23.063)			(10.516)			(54.715)
Education of head of household			3.198			88.133			4.361			2.849			6.056
			(2.448)			(192.836)			(2.489)			(1.478)			(4.753)
Gender of head of household			-1.425			-1064.814			-13.592			-14.375			11.197
			(29.732)			(1613.084)			(47.703)			(17.475)			(47.075)
Age of head of household			-0.076			9.482			-0.412			-0.405			-1.365
			(0.543)			(32.036)			(0.777)			(0.347)			(1.036)
Head of household is employed			-4.336			396.511			33.329			7.265			24.319
			(12.338)			(1551.110)			(21.788)			(9.892)			(24.135)
Constant	-15.373	-15.221	-3.218	-24.024	-47.570	-7854.537	-11.211	-13.163	-93.907	-62.625	-68.926	-51.683	-94.557*	0.316	-273.542
	(26.130)	(25.451)	(55.604)	(55.652)	(71.352)	(6053.846)	(8.083)	(8.981)	(91.329)	(41.245)	(42.339)	(53.812)	(47.296)	(2.267)	(199.470)
N	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38

Estimation results for number of fights between Christians and Muslims. * p<0.05, Standard Errors in parentheses.



Figure H: Number of respective public statements by Christians and Muslim leaders. Based on Models 2, 5, 8, 11, and 14 of Table N.

Table O: Effect of Power-sharing on elite rhetoric.

		Obs	Mean	Min	Max
Express intent to cooperate	Power-sharing	11	3.55	0	24
	No Power-sharing	27	1.26	0	27
Appeal to others to settle dispute	Power-sharing	11	0.55	0	4
	No Power-sharing	27	0.15	0	3
Express intent to meet or negotiate	Power-sharing	11	1.64	0	16
	No Power-sharing	27	0.85	0	18
Make a visit	Power-sharing	11	4.45	0	38
	No Power-sharing	27	2.22	0	47
Engage in Diplomatic Cooperation	Power-sharing	11	9.09	0	83
	No Power-sharing	27	1.96	0	40

Descriptive statistics for the number conciliatory statements by Christian and Muslim leaders across 38 Nigerian districts.

7 Intra-class correlation

Statistical analyses might over-estimate the precision of their estimates if they do not account for the degree to which observations are independent of all other observations in the dataset. For example, the sample size increases by 1 if an interviewer asks one person in a household a question. However, if we ask a second person in the house the same question we cannot increase the sample size by another observation. This second interview might increase the number of observations, but not necessarily the sample size, as the second interview foes not provide much additional information over what we already knew. After all, the responses of the two individuals from the same household are likely correlated and therefore not independent of each other. To the extent that this correlation among observations in the dataset becomes larger, each observation contain less unique information. Not accounting for this intra-class correlation of observations results in standard errors that are too small and consequently p-values that are too low.

Estimating regression models with clustered standard errors accounts for this if this problem is present in the data. We consequently re-estimate every model with errors clustered at the primary sampling unit to test whether observations within each cluster are more similar than observations between clusters. With respect to the overall degree of inter-religious violence, Table P compares the estimates with and without clustering based on the Authors' data, while Tables Q and R present the results for the ACLED and GDELT datasets respectively. We also re-estimate the models pertaining to the effect of power-sharing institutions on the elite rhetoric. Table S shows the effect on the number of statements expressing the intent to cooperate, Table T concerns the appeals to others to settle a dispute, Table U presents the findings with respect to statements that express the intent to meet or negotiate, Table V shows the effect of power-sharing on statements announcing a visit, and Table W concerns elites engaging in diplomatic cooperation. Lastly, we re-estimate the effect of power-sharing institutions on the perception of the

masses: Table X compares regular to clustered regressions for the degree of competition individuals experience, while Table Y concerns individuals' perception of the police.

In the large majority of models clustering the errors does not have any effect on the statistical significance of the findings. Intra-class correlation does not seem to be a problem with our data. There are two reasons why this is the case.

First, there is little reason to expect much 'overlap' of observations. Only a small number of households was interviewed relative to the total number of households in that district. Table Z shows that between 0.001% and 0.008% of households were interviewed in each district. Consequently, the data obtained from each household is unlikely to be correlated. Each additional observation is therefore likely to add additional information to the sample. Second, recall that we analyze data from the 2006 National Core Welfare Indicators Question Survey. Given the high inequality in Nigeria, it was of paramount importance that the sampling procedure captures the heterogeneity in the population. For this reason, the survey employed two-stage cluster sampling in each district by first randomly sampling 10 Enumeration Areas in each district. Enumeration Areas were previously demarcated from an independent national census (similar to election districts in the United States re-drawn after each census). The second stage was a random sample of 10 housing units within each Enumeration Areas. As a consequence of this sampling procedure, there is a high degree of heterogeneity within clusters for most variables, with few exceptions such as gender, where most respondents are male. As such, the standard errors for the variables is likely inversely proportional to the square root of the number of households rather than the number of clusters. For this reason, clustering standard errors is likely to have little effect on sample precision.

Table P: Effect of Power-sharing on the number of fights between Christians and Muslims.

	Regular			Clustered		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Power-sharing	-1.345*	-1.046*	-0.939*	-1.342*	-1.046*	-0.939*
	(0.067)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.290)	(0.397)	(0.410)
2nd welfare quintile	-0.380*	-0.268*	-0.218*	-0.377*	-0.266	-0.214
	(0.083)	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.188)	(0.210)	(0.221)
3rd welfare quintile	-0.973*	-0.870*	-0.829*	-0.967*	-0.865*	-0.819*
	(0.092)	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.212)	(0.239)	(0.263)
4th welfare quintile	-0.997*	-0.840*	-0.814*	-0.995*	-0.839*	-0.809*
	(0.089)	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.264)	(0.268)	(0.284)
5th welfare quintile	-0.698*	-0.565*	-0.483*	-0.711*	-0.581*	-0.496
	(0.090)	(0.100)	(0.109)	(0.259)	(0.277)	(0.305)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		-0.376	-0.472*		-0.377	-0.472
		(0.194)	(0.195)		(0.417)	(0.414)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		-0.315	-0.358		-0.318	-0.365
		(0.216)	(0.219)		(0.451)	(0.465)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		-0.585*	-0.735*		-0.585	-0.738
		(0.199)	(0.202)		(0.663)	(0.622)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		-0.499*	-0.569*		-0.478	-0.548
		(0.197)	(0.198)		(0.572)	(0.581)
Total population	-0.007*	-0.007*	-0.007*	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Propensity score (Author's data)	9.166*	9.399*	8.352*	9.109*	9.345*	8.311
	(1.622)	(1.632)	(1.650)	(4.415)	(4.338)	(4.420)
Education of head of household			0.018			0.015
			(0.016)			(0.036)
Age of head of household			-0.003			-0.003
			(0.002)			(0.003)
Gender of head of household			-0.019			-0.030
			(0.138)			(0.206)
Reason for poverty: Lack of adequate land			-0.200			-0.199
			(0.155)			(0.362)
Reason for poverty: Lack of jobs			-0.100			-0.105
			(0.091)			(0.199)
Reason for poverty: Hard econmoic times			0.381*			0.390*
			(0.066)			(0.129)
Reason for poverty: Too much competition			0.444*			0.447*
			(0.152)			(0.200)
Reason for poverty: Cultural or religious reasons			-0.176			-0.174
			(0.237)			(0.350)
Constant	-0.486*	-0.595*	-0.369	-0.471	-0.580	-0.343
	(0.241)	(0.244)	(0.294)	(0.655)	(0.642)	(0.730)
N	6,113	6,113	6,014	6,101	6,101	6,002

Authors' data: Estimation results for number of fights between Christians and Muslims.
* $p<0.05$.

Table Q: Effect of Power-sharing on the number of fights between Christians and Muslims.

	Regular			Clustered		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Power-sharing	-0.531*	-2.283*	-2.025*	-0.522	-2.283*	-2.023*
	(0.110)	(0.283)	(0.280)	(0.382)	(0.781)	(0.768)
2nd welfare quintile	-0.284*	-0.646*	-0.578*	-0.279	-0.642*	-0.571*
	(0.128)	(0.143)	(0.141)	(0.234)	(0.233)	(0.250)
3rd welfare quintile	-0.660*	-1.140*	-0.985*	-0.652*	-1.135*	-0.970*
	(0.138)	(0.155)	(0.153)	(0.308)	(0.309)	(0.289)
4th welfare quintile	-0.377*	-0.827*	-0.795*	-0.376	-0.829*	-0.788*
	(0.134)	(0.152)	(0.151)	(0.300)	(0.310)	(0.319)
5th welfare quintile	-0.297*	-0.762*	-0.758*	-0.335	-0.815*	-0.802*
	(0.136)	(0.151)	(0.155)	(0.319)	(0.336)	(0.311)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		1.996*	1.823*		1.991*	1.816*
		(0.371)	(0.363)		(0.715)	(0.736)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		2.546*	2.308*		2.540*	2.296*
		(0.382)	(0.374)		(0.916)	(0.910)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		2.226*	2.005*		2.226*	2.004*
		(0.357)	(0.349)		(0.887)	(0.859)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		2.376*	2.099*		2.427*	2.157*
		(0.362)	(0.350)		(0.947)	(0.916)
Total population	0.003*	0.005*	0.004*	0.003	0.004*	0.004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Propensity score (ACLED)	6.402*	5.034*	6.055*	6.298	4.876	5.915
	(2.464)	(2.514)	(2.380)	(5.710)	(5.579)	(5.048)
Education of head of household			0.178*			0.172*
			(0.022)			(0.045)
Age of head of household			0.007*			0.007
			(0.003)			(0.005)
Gender of head of household			0.649*			0.641*
			(0.156)			(0.230)
Reason for poverty: Lack of adequate land			-0.312			-0.307
			(0.246)			(0.507)
Reason for poverty: Lack of jobs			-0.283*			-0.283
			(0.133)			(0.253)
Reason for poverty: Hard econmoic times			0.694*			0.712*
			(0.088)			(0.192)
Reason for poverty: Too much competition			1.293*			1.297*
			(0.162)			(0.253)
Reason for poverty: Cultural or religious reasons			-1.589*			-1.596*
			(0.628)			(0.646)
Constant	-2.941*	-2.720*	-4.342*	-2.914*	-2.687*	-4.301*
	(0.235)	(0.241)	(0.317)	(0.608)	(0.614)	(0.642)
N	6,113	6,113	6,014	6,101	6,101	6,002

ACLED data: Estimation results for number of fights between Christians and Muslims.
* $p<0.05$.

Table R: Effect of Power-sharing on the number of fights between Christians and Muslims.

	Regular			Clustered		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Power-sharing	-0.918*	-0.399	-0.485	-0.909*	-0.397	-0.474
	(0.167)	(0.259)	(0.265)	(0.413)	(0.495)	(0.496)
2nd welfare quintile	-1.238*	-1.169*	-1.239*	-1.225*	-1.155*	-1.215*
	(0.197)	(0.221)	(0.229)	(0.353)	(0.454)	(0.426)
3rd welfare quintile	-1.825*	-1.664*	-1.719*	-1.797*	-1.638*	-1.678*
	(0.224)	(0.242)	(0.252)	(0.393)	(0.479)	(0.510)
4th welfare quintile	-1.288*	-0.976*	-1.371*	-1.274*	-0.964	-1.335*
	(0.209)	(0.231)	(0.248)	(0.461)	(0.554)	(0.550)
5th welfare quintile	-1.135*	-0.774*	-1.167*	-1.218*	-0.865	-1.214*
	(0.212)	(0.228)	(0.260)	(0.466)	(0.553)	(0.556)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		-0.019	-0.088		-0.030	-0.095
		(0.436)	(0.454)		(0.645)	(0.648)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		-0.226	-0.425		-0.245	-0.447
		(0.520)	(0.540)		(0.722)	(0.732)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		-1.254*	-1.087*		-1.257	-1.093
		(0.485)	(0.494)		(0.947)	(0.895)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		-2.993*	-2.836*		-2.885*	-2.745*
		(0.806)	(0.807)		(0.931)	(0.932)
Total population	0.007*	0.006*	0.005*	0.006*	0.006*	0.005*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Propensity score (GDELT)	3.521	1.594	3.000	3.521	1.615	3.043
	(2.290)	(2.370)	(2.502)	(3.977)	(4.196)	(4.285)
Education of head of household			0.169*			0.154*
			(0.037)			(0.059)
Age of head of household			0.008			0.009
			(0.005)			(0.007)
Gender of head of household			0.161			0.121
			(0.308)			(0.377)
Reason for poverty: Lack of adequate land			-2.252*			-2.249*
			(0.553)			(0.670)
Reason for poverty: Lack of jobs			-0.207			-0.241
			(0.213)			(0.349)
Reason for poverty: Hard econmoic times			0.267			0.296
			(0.153)			(0.249)
Reason for poverty: Too much competition			-0.749			-0.728
			(0.413)			(1.089)
Reason for poverty: Cultural or religious reasons			-0.453			-0.436
			(0.529)			(0.454)
Constant	-2.550*	-2.462*	-3.073*	-2.516*	-2.431*	-3.013*
	(0.261)	(0.259)	(0.468)	(0.723)	(0.713)	(0.884)
N	6,113	6,113	6,014	6,101	6,101	6,002

GDELT data: Estimation results for number of fights between Christians and Muslims.
* $p<0.05$.

Table S: Effect of Power-sharing on elite rhetoric.

	Regular			Clustered		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Power-sharing	2.717*	1.665*	1.679*	2.727*	1.665*	1.673*
	(0.126)	(0.204)	(0.221)	(0.320)	(0.388)	(0.408)
2nd welfare quintile	-0.568*	-1.072*	-1.036*	-0.565*	-1.062*	-1.026*
	(0.161)	(0.197)	(0.216)	(0.245)	(0.338)	(0.340)
3rd welfare quintile	-0.670*	-1.411*	-1.333*	-0.665*	-1.393*	-1.317*
	(0.169)	(0.211)	(0.231)	(0.297)	(0.382)	(0.425)
4th welfare quintile	-0.454*	-0.866*	-1.056*	-0.456	-0.862*	-1.040*
	(0.171)	(0.208)	(0.231)	(0.308)	(0.411)	(0.439)
5th welfare quintile	-0.021	-0.552*	-0.608*	-0.084	-0.634	-0.671
	(0.173)	(0.205)	(0.239)	(0.309)	(0.400)	(0.424)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		1.481*	1.392*		1.470*	1.389*
		(0.324)	(0.339)		(0.387)	(0.387)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		2.056*	1.860*		2.035*	1.852*
		(0.345)	(0.362)		(0.512)	(0.476)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		1.066*	1.194*		1.061	1.184
		(0.318)	(0.338)		(0.591)	(0.629)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		1.471*	1.463*		1.548*	1.540*
		(0.333)	(0.354)		(0.594)	(0.589)
Total population	0.010*	0.011*	0.011*	0.010*	0.011*	0.011*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Propensity score (Intent)	-0.330	-0.574	-0.113	-0.427	-0.570	-0.099
	(1.694)	(1.751)	(1.827)	(3.236)	(3.343)	(3.372)
Reason for poverty: Cultural or religious reasons			-1.139*			-1.130*
			(0.478)			(0.459)
Household owns a radio			0.238			0.230
			(0.170)			(0.193)
Education of head of household			0.094*			0.084
			(0.031)			(0.051)
Gender of head of household			0.597*			0.569*
			(0.249)			(0.278)
Age of head of household			0.004			0.004
			(0.004)			(0.005)
Head of household is employed			0.286			0.263
			(0.171)			(0.274)
Constant	-2.962*	-2.792*	-4.274*	-2.921*	-2.772*	-4.192*
	(0.348)	(0.364)	(0.591)	(0.761)	(0.788)	(0.951)
N	6,113	6,113	5,699	6,101	6,101	5,687

Elite Rhetoric: Models predicting the number of events where religious leaders express the intent to cooperate. * $p<0.05$.

Table T: Effect of Power-sharing on elite rhetoric.

	Regular			Clustered		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Power-sharing	1.876*	0.606*	0.491*	1.891*	0.609	0.504
	(0.114)	(0.202)	(0.215)	(0.346)	(0.527)	(0.517)
2nd welfare quintile	-0.412*	-1.176*	-1.210*	-0.413	-1.163*	-1.192*
	(0.168)	(0.221)	(0.240)	(0.275)	(0.391)	(0.384)
3rd welfare quintile	-0.402*	-1.497*	-1.562*	-0.401	-1.477*	-1.538*
	(0.167)	(0.231)	(0.252)	(0.328)	(0.426)	(0.470)
4th welfare quintile	-0.276	-0.813*	-1.125*	-0.279	-0.809	-1.112*
	(0.167)	(0.211)	(0.241)	(0.330)	(0.426)	(0.447)
5th welfare quintile	0.070	-0.649*	-0.802*	-0.003	-0.755	-0.875
	(0.165)	(0.206)	(0.238)	(0.346)	(0.437)	(0.459)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		1.810*	1.823*		1.797*	1.799*
		(0.325)	(0.338)		(0.451)	(0.446)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		2.513*	2.562*		2.488*	2.530*
		(0.345)	(0.360)		(0.565)	(0.567)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		1.195*	1.330*		1.188	1.312*
		(0.308)	(0.330)		(0.617)	(0.646)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		1.689*	1.730*		1.786*	1.804*
		(0.316)	(0.331)		(0.639)	(0.640)
Total population	0.011*	0.014*	0.014*	0.011*	0.014*	0.014*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Propensity score (Appeal)	31.762*	40.080*	43.395*	32.470	40.187	43.400*
	(11.224)	(11.148)	(11.568)	(21.731)	(21.156)	(21.614)
Reason for poverty: Cultural or religious reasons			-1.565*			-1.546*
			(0.659)			(0.693)
Household owns a radio			0.164			0.158
			(0.178)			(0.264)
Education of head of household			0.108*			0.096
			(0.030)			(0.055)
Gender of head of household			0.315			0.267
			(0.248)			(0.359)
Age of head of household			0.004			0.004
			(0.004)			(0.007)
Head of household is employed			0.747*			0.733
			(0.182)			(0.462)
Constant	-8.129*	-9.183*	-11.076*	-8.198*	-9.166*	-10.980*
	(1.731)	(1.717)	(1.832)	(3.512)	(3.380)	(3.582)
N	6,113	6,113	5,699	6,101	6,101	5,687

Elite Rhetoric: Models predicting the number of events where religious leaders appeal to others to settle dispute. * $p<0.05$.

Table U: Effect of Power-sharing on elite rhetoric.

	Regular			Clustered		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Power-sharing	2.575*	1.183*	1.066*	2.589*	1.188*	1.080
	(0.131)	(0.229)	(0.247)	(0.382)	(0.590)	(0.584)
2nd welfare quintile	-0.662*	-1.587*	-1.572*	-0.666*	-1.578*	-1.558*
	(0.193)	(0.257)	(0.281)	(0.333)	(0.505)	(0.504)
3rd welfare quintile	-0.701*	-1.928*	-1.954*	-0.704	-1.916*	-1.942*
	(0.193)	(0.261)	(0.289)	(0.361)	(0.483)	(0.513)
4th welfare quintile	-0.700*	-1.408*	-1.705*	-0.710*	-1.409*	-1.697*
	(0.201)	(0.253)	(0.286)	(0.356)	(0.520)	(0.557)
5th welfare quintile	-0.358	-1.212*	-1.323*	-0.434	-1.302*	-1.375*
	(0.204)	(0.254)	(0.295)	(0.362)	(0.506)	(0.530)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		2.074*	2.070*		2.062*	2.047*
		(0.368)	(0.386)		(0.582)	(0.562)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		2.800*	2.812*		2.782*	2.792*
		(0.389)	(0.406)		(0.665)	(0.655)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		1.357*	1.486*		1.348	1.469*
		(0.354)	(0.379)		(0.718)	(0.748)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		1.762*	1.774*		1.837*	1.820*
		(0.370)	(0.393)		(0.756)	(0.749)
Total population	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*	0.006	0.006	0.005
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Propensity score (Meet)	23.291*	27.927*	28.336*	23.937*	28.282*	28.529*
	(4.831)	(4.972)	(5.144)	(9.607)	(10.156)	(10.475)
Reason for poverty: Cultural or religious reasons			-1.603*			-1.596*
			(0.640)			(0.600)
Household owns a radio			0.159			0.158
			(0.209)			(0.329)
Education of head of household			0.119*			0.109
			(0.034)			(0.058)
Gender of head of household			0.504			0.456
			(0.272)			(0.352)
Age of head of household			0.007			0.008
			(0.005)			(0.006)
Head of household is employed			0.836*			0.817*
			(0.196)			(0.366)
Constant	-5.787*	-5.817*	-7.691*	-5.789*	-5.810*	-7.613*
	(0.299)	(0.304)	(0.620)	(0.869)	(0.832)	(1.221)
N	6,113	6,113	5,699	6,101	6,101	5,687

Elite Rhetoric: Models predicting the number of events where religious leaders express the intent to meet or negotiate. * $p<0.05$.

Table V: Effect of Power-sharing on elite rhetoric.

	Regular			Clustered		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Power-sharing	2.668*	1.546*	1.466*	2.674*	1.548*	1.479*
	(0.112)	(0.171)	(0.178)	(0.329)	(0.471)	(0.459)
2nd welfare quintile	-0.435*	-0.824*	-0.810*	-0.430*	-0.817*	-0.799*
	(0.118)	(0.140)	(0.153)	(0.206)	(0.237)	(0.244)
3rd welfare quintile	-0.765*	-1.428*	-1.414*	-0.754*	-1.407*	-1.398*
	(0.124)	(0.148)	(0.163)	(0.266)	(0.291)	(0.307)
4th welfare quintile	-0.718*	-1.077*	-1.223*	-0.704*	-1.059*	-1.215*
	(0.123)	(0.149)	(0.165)	(0.284)	(0.332)	(0.368)
5th welfare quintile	-0.509*	-0.938*	-1.051*	-0.551	-0.996*	-1.074*
	(0.124)	(0.148)	(0.173)	(0.311)	(0.323)	(0.344)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		1.367*	1.422*		1.360*	1.403*
		(0.244)	(0.252)		(0.322)	(0.323)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		2.033*	2.188*		2.013*	2.160*
		(0.258)	(0.267)		(0.525)	(0.533)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		1.147*	1.019*		1.132*	1.009
		(0.238)	(0.246)		(0.573)	(0.610)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		1.363*	1.230*		1.425*	1.255
		(0.247)	(0.259)		(0.692)	(0.672)
Total population	0.105*	0.107*	0.109*	0.104*	0.106*	0.108*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Propensity score (Visit)	95.279*	96.502*	98.399*	94.331*	95.566*	97.733*
	(5.579)	(5.529)	(5.644)	(15.586)	(15.451)	(15.008)
Reason for poverty: Cultural or religious reasons			-0.408			-0.416
			(0.379)			(0.610)
Household owns a radio			0.201			0.196
			(0.128)			(0.223)
Education of head of household			0.139*			0.131*
			(0.023)			(0.048)
Gender of head of household			-0.094			-0.149
			(0.195)			(0.325)
Age of head of household			0.011*			0.011*
			(0.003)			(0.006)
Head of household is employed			0.991*			0.991*
			(0.135)			(0.320)
Constant	-55.403*	-55.920*	-58.736*	-54.831*	-55.357*	-58.273*
	(3.166)	(3.138)	(3.241)	(8.794)	(8.731)	(8.508)
N	6,113	6,113	5,699	6,101	6,101	5,687

Elite Rhetoric: Models predicting the number of events where religious leaders make a visit to a religious leader. * $p<0.05$.

Table W: Effect of Power-sharing on elite rhetoric.

	Regular			Clustered		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Power-sharing	2.421*	1.100*	1.000*	2.435*	1.105*	1.008*
	(0.119)	(0.219)	(0.232)	(0.384)	(0.435)	(0.444)
2nd welfare quintile	-0.475*	-0.980*	-0.984*	-0.477	-0.977*	-0.979*
	(0.172)	(0.200)	(0.219)	(0.310)	(0.390)	(0.390)
3rd welfare quintile	-0.673*	-1.402*	-1.413*	-0.670*	-1.390*	-1.404*
	(0.184)	(0.223)	(0.247)	(0.311)	(0.401)	(0.441)
4th welfare quintile	-0.297	-0.824*	-1.107*	-0.304	-0.825	-1.102*
	(0.195)	(0.230)	(0.260)	(0.355)	(0.467)	(0.539)
5th welfare quintile	0.014	-0.615*	-0.864*	-0.055	-0.703	-0.926
	(0.196)	(0.230)	(0.282)	(0.364)	(0.464)	(0.500)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		1.649*	1.707*		1.643*	1.698*
		(0.342)	(0.352)		(0.437)	(0.434)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		2.155*	2.322*		2.139*	2.307*
		(0.369)	(0.380)		(0.518)	(0.523)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		1.395*	1.492*		1.385	1.477
		(0.335)	(0.351)		(0.707)	(0.792)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		1.733*	1.834*		1.807*	1.889*
		(0.351)	(0.373)		(0.715)	(0.709)
Total population	0.011*	0.011*	0.010*	0.011*	0.011*	0.010*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Propensity score (Cooperate)	5.770*	4.196*	3.800*	5.597	4.046	3.666
	(1.474)	(1.462)	(1.531)	(3.899)	(4.171)	(4.149)
Reason for poverty: Cultural or religious reasons			-1.632*			-1.617*
			(0.485)			(0.594)
Household owns a radio			0.328			0.319
			(0.174)			(0.213)
Education of head of household			0.163*			0.154*
			(0.033)			(0.054)
Gender of head of household			0.199			0.159
			(0.266)			(0.342)
Age of head of household			0.008			0.009
			(0.004)			(0.006)
Head of household is employed			0.576*			0.557
			(0.187)			(0.317)
Constant	-3.450*	-2.709*	-4.210*	-3.358*	-2.627	-4.075*
	(0.570)	(0.573)	(0.782)	(1.665)	(1.793)	(1.798)
N	6,113	6,113	5,699	6,101	6,101	5,687

Elite Rhetoric: Models predicting the number of events where religious leaders engage in diplomatic cooperation. * $p<0.05$.

Table X: Effect of Power-sharing on individual-level perceptions.

	Regular			Clustered		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Power-sharing	-1.991*	-2.335*	-2.228*	-1.991*	-2.335*	-2.227*
	(0.328)	(0.596)	(0.602)	(0.376)	(0.696)	(0.728)
2nd welfare quintile	0.241	0.255	-0.305	0.240	0.254	-0.305
	(0.195)	(0.198)	(0.230)	(0.369)	(0.385)	(0.379)
3rd welfare quintile	-0.763*	-0.841*	-1.404*	-0.764	-0.841	-1.406*
	(0.264)	(0.275)	(0.305)	(0.440)	(0.472)	(0.501)
4th welfare quintile	-0.768*	-0.825*	-1.496*	-0.767*	-0.825*	-1.495*
	(0.268)	(0.278)	(0.318)	(0.375)	(0.399)	(0.484)
5th welfare quintile	-1.080*	-1.180*	-2.338*	-1.069*	-1.169*	-2.325*
	(0.296)	(0.309)	(0.391)	(0.527)	(0.576)	(0.868)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		-0.768	-0.556		-0.767	-0.557
		(1.173)	(1.180)		(1.247)	(1.277)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		1.197	1.392		1.197	1.394
		(0.955)	(0.965)		(1.073)	(1.110)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		0.816	0.834		0.815	0.832
		(0.954)	(0.962)		(1.053)	(1.107)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		1.425	1.490		1.414	1.477
		(0.961)	(0.976)		(1.160)	(1.250)
Total population	0.016	0.023	0.011	0.018	0.024	0.013
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.097)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.144)
Propensity score (Competition)	14.940	15.323	14.986	14.931	15.314	15.032
	(12.145)	(12.208)	(14.184)	(22.738)	(23.081)	(24.666)
Age of head of household			-0.015*			-0.014
			(0.007)			(0.010)
Education of head of household			0.240*			0.240*
			(0.049)			(0.076)
Gender of head of household			0.092			0.087
			(0.386)			(0.492)
Head of household is married			-0.652*			-0.658
			(0.252)			(0.362)
Head of household is employed			1.114*			1.110*
			(0.401)			(0.469)
Household has food problems			0.110			0.108
			(0.169)			(0.307)
Household owns a TV			-1.457*			-1.454*
			(0.238)			(0.364)
Household owns a mobile phone			0.744*			0.731
			(0.333)			(0.422)
Household owns a radio			-0.780*			-0.780*
			(0.298)			(0.339)
Household owns a motorcycle			0.184			0.189
			(0.229)			(0.373)
Household owns a vehicle			1.264			1.261
			(0.741)			(0.757)
Household owns a house			0.404			0.403
			(0.227)			(0.276)
Constant	-3.352*	-3.357*	-4.408*	-3.355*	-3.360*	-4.397*
	(0.476)	(0.479)	(1.166)	(0.616)	(0.629)	(1.498)
N	6,113	6,113	5,457	6,101	6,101	5,448

Perception of the general population with respect to the degree of competition they experience. * p<0.05.

Table Y: Effect of Power-sharing on individual-level perceptions.

	Regular			Clustered		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Power-sharing	0.303*	-0.322	-0.210	0.301	-0.321	-0.207
	(0.094)	(0.307)	(0.334)	(0.294)	(0.699)	(0.865)
2nd welfare quintile	-0.064	-0.210	-0.178	-0.066	-0.213	-0.182
	(0.198)	(0.230)	(0.265)	(0.412)	(0.477)	(0.636)
3rd welfare quintile	0.514*	0.363	0.108	0.511	0.360	0.105
	(0.180)	(0.206)	(0.252)	(0.470)	(0.541)	(0.724)
4th welfare quintile	0.943*	0.629*	0.382	0.941	0.628	0.384
	(0.169)	(0.199)	(0.245)	(0.496)	(0.572)	(0.748)
5th welfare quintile	1.645*	1.437*	0.827*	1.645*	1.439*	0.827
	(0.166)	(0.188)	(0.249)	(0.539)	(0.612)	(0.838)
Power-sharing * 2nd quintile		0.428	0.368		0.429	0.371
		(0.443)	(0.467)		(0.861)	(0.965)
Power-sharing * 3rd quintile		0.412	0.525		0.413	0.522
		(0.407)	(0.442)		(0.823)	(0.981)
Power-sharing * 4th quintile		0.928*	0.988*		0.926	0.980
		(0.350)	(0.380)		(0.800)	(0.936)
Power-sharing * 5th quintile		0.669*	0.640		0.662	0.634
		(0.341)	(0.372)		(0.827)	(0.982)
Total population	-0.004	-0.001	-0.166*	-0.002	0.001	-0.165
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.157)	(0.158)	(0.164)
Propensity score (Police)	6.879*	6.781*	6.248*	6.920*	6.821*	6.264*
	(0.869)	(0.869)	(1.000)	(2.741)	(2.713)	(2.954)
Age of head of household			-0.004			-0.003
			(0.004)			(0.008)
Education of head of household			0.110*			0.109*
			(0.027)			(0.053)
Gender of head of household			0.014			-0.001
			(0.267)			(0.383)
Head of household is married			-0.059			-0.093
			(0.171)			(0.263)
Head of household is employed			-0.387*			-0.391
			(0.145)			(0.426)
Household has food problems			-0.119			-0.129
			(0.098)			(0.224)
Household owns a TV			-0.642*			-0.637*
			(0.122)			(0.255)
Household owns a mobile phone			0.058			0.035
			(0.133)			(0.224)
Household owns a radio			-0.231			-0.232
			(0.208)			(0.396)
Household owns a motorcycle			-0.474*			-0.472*
			(0.104)			(0.210)
Household owns a vehicle			-0.088			-0.050
			(0.161)			(0.297)
Household owns a house			-0.367*			-0.369
			(0.120)			(0.267)
Constant	-3.832*	-3.627*	-1.524*	-3.840*	-3.635*	-1.520
	(0.178)	(0.191)	(0.452)	(0.439)	(0.444)	(0.916)
N	5,982	5,982	5,370	5,971	5,971	5,361

Perception of the general population with respect to the degree to which they perceive police services as improved. * p<0.05.

Table Z: Percentage of households interviewed.

District	Total population	Average household size	Number of households	number of interviews	% of HH interviewed
Barkin Ladi	179,805	4.44	40,541	131	0.003%
Bassa	189,834	4.04	46,998	153	0.003%
Birnin-G	258,581	6.36	40,653	157	0.004%
Bokkos	179,550	5.60	32,041	159	0.005%
Chikun	372,272	8.08	46,086	167	0.004%
Giwa	292,384	6.79	43,082	225	0.005%
Igabi	430,753	7.67	56,149	201	0.004%
Ikara	194,723	6.28	31,025	181	0.006%
Jaba	155,973	5.99	26,047	169	0.006%
Jema'a	278,202	5.05	55,136	153	0.003%
Jos East	88,301	4.33	20,407	159	0.008%
Jos North	437,217	3.52	124,039	141	0.001%
Jos South	311,392	4.30	72,333	141	0.002%
Kachia	252,568	6.48	38,990	180	0.005%
Kaduna North	364,575	5.49	66,397	218	0.003%
Kaduna South	402,731	6.36	63,325	164	0.003%
Kagarko	239,058	6.11	39,138	184	0.005%
Kajuru	109,810	4.81	22,814	166	0.007%
Kanam	167,619	6.09	27,520	143	0.005%
Kanke	124,268	5.70	21,807	146	0.007%
Kaura	174,626	5.71	30,575	149	0.005%
Kauru	221,276	5.38	41,129	150	0.004%
Kubau	280,704	7.22	38,884	178	0.005%
Kudan	138,956	6.68	20,806	165	0.008%
Langtang North	142,316	5.60	25,414	170	0.007%
Lere	339,740	6.75	50,308	158	0.003%
Makarfi	146,574	6.54	22,412	187	0.008%
Mangu	300,520	5.70	52,752	187	0.004%
Pankshin	190,114	5.85	32,500	153	0.005%
Qua'anpa	197,276	5.13	38,463	155	0.004%
Riyom	131,778	5.00	26,356	164	0.006%
Sabon-Ga	291,358	7.01	41,553	171	0.004%
Sanga	151,485	5.01	30,226	170	0.006%
Shendam	205,119	4.09	50,105	160	0.003%
Soba	291,173	6.24	46,689	203	0.004%
Wase	159,861	5.39	29,671	147	0.005%
ZangonKa	318,991	4.63	68,837	149	0.002%
Zaria	406,990	5.45	74,706	192	0.003%

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