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Online Appendix

This online appendix provides supplementary information on the empirical results presented in the article "War Abroad and Homicides at Home: Evidence from the United States" Please note that references to Tables and Figures in the article are represented by roman numerals whereas references to Tables and Figures in this appendix are denoted by capitalized letters.

1 Determining the legitimacy of wars

1.1 Approach 1: UN votes

The idea Our first approach to identifying which wars are legitimate or illegitimate relies on the United Nations. In times of war, citizens might turn to an external audience with moral authority to assess whether their government's actions are inconsistent with social norms.

A vote by the United Nations (UN) Security Council or General Assembly can serve as a strong signal of legitimacy for several reasons. On a conceptual level, a UN vote authorizing a war provides legal legitimacy (Thomas 2014). While not a prima facie substitute for moral legitimacy, a war legally approved by a neutral body has the potential to be morally acceptable. Using Weber's terminology, formal decisions like UN votes hold 'legal-rational authority.' This type of authority implies that individuals obey not a specific leader, but the content of the law embodying a uniform set of principles. A UN vote thus provides social legitimacy, where actors believe that an action is morally legitimate based on cues from society. Responses from the World Values Survey indicate that nearly 60% of American respondents possess a "great deal of confidence in the United Nations" (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015: 461)

However, whether U.S. citizens actually follow these considerations raises three empirical questions. First, do U.S. citizens know of the UN? Survey evidence suggests they do: The General Social Survey conducted in 2004 finds that 96% of U.S. citizens do know what the United Nations are. Second, do citizens think that the UN holds moral authority? Opinion polls again suggest that they do: A World Public Opinion poll in 2008 asked whether the UN should actively promote human rights in member states, to which 70% of respondents answered 'yes.' The Chicago Council on Global Affairs asked if the UN should have "the authority to go into countries in order to investigate violations

	No, should not	Yes, should	No opinion
2005 Feb 7	85%	13%	2%
1997 Nov 21	88%	9%	3%
1996 Apr 25	77%	17%	6%
1995 Oct 19	84%	9%	7%
1990 Oct 18	88%	8%	4%
1985 Aug 13	81%	11%	8%
1983 Oct 7	79%	12%	9%
1982 Jun 25	79%	12%	9%
1975 Nov 21	74%	16%	10%
1975 Feb 7	75%	11%	14%
1967 Jul 13	85%	10%	5%
1963 Nov 8	79%	8%	13%
1962 Jan 11	90%	5%	5%
1951 Nov 11	78%	11%	11%
1951 May 19	79%	11%	10%
1951 Jan 14	72%	14%	13%

Table A. Responses to the question "Should the United States give up its membership to the United Nations, or not?" in Gallup Polls.

of human rights," which was affirmed by 75% of surveyed U.S. citizens in 2006, 73% in 2008, and 72% in 2010. The 2004 General Social Survey finds that 75% of surveyed U.S. citizens agreed with the statement that "If a country seriously violates human rights, the United Nations should intervene" (Council on Foreign Relations 2011). The data suggest that public knowledge of the United Nations is not a phenomenon restricted to the 2000s. Gallup Polls included questions about the United Nations for much of the 20th century. For example, Gallup first included the question "Should the United States give up its membership to the United Nations, or not?" in 1951. The responses to all instances in which this question was posed are available in Table A. The data show that the large majority had either a positive or negative opinion about the United Nations, indicating that they were aware of what the United Nations stand for.

Furthermore, scholarly works provide additional evidence. For example, Emerson and Claude (1952) and Bull (1980) demonstrate how citizens were aware that United Nations are a forum for conflict between states, particularly during the Cold War. In 1990s, after the Cold War had ended, Voeten (2004) summarizes the discussion of the role of international bodies such as the United Nations to regulate the influence of the sole remaining superpower, the United States.

Third, even if U.S. citizens grant the UN moral authority, does this matter for individual's opinions and behavior? There is evidence that this is the case: Kreps and Wallace (2016) find that references by United Nations to drone strikes violating the sovereignty of target states are associated with a drop of between 6% and 8% in approval. Both Wallace (2013) and Tomz (2008) show that respondents are far more likely to oppose policies that would violate international law than to oppose otherwise identical policies that do not violate rulings by the UN. In sum, there are both conceptual and empirical reasons to expect that the UN verdict regarding the legitimacy of wars to matter for individuals.[1] For these reasons, UN decisions are an appropriate, albeit imperfect, proxy distinguishing legitimate versus illegitimate wars.

Results We classify the Vietnam War, the Lebanon Crisis, the occupation of the Dominican Republic, and the invasion of Panama as illegitimate wars. Explicit statements by the United Nations make clear that these military actions were illegitimate. For example, the United Nations Security Council condemned U.S. military action against the Dominican Republic with Resolutions 156 and 203. Similarly, the United Nations General Assembly denounce the U.S. invasion of Panama with Resolution 44-240. U.S. military action against Lebanon was subject to Resolution 129. The United Nations did not pass a resolution concerning the Vietnam War, despite several attempts, due to vetoes by the

[1]The legitimacy of wars could easily be confused with the legitimacy of government. However, our research design addresses this possibility: As each U.S. government elected between 1928 and 2014 is considered legitimate, our study examines only on the variation in the legitimacy of wars.

Soviet Union and China. However, U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations from 1961 to 1971, both publicly denounced the Vietnam War and privately sought to open diplomatic channels between the United States and Vietnam.[2] Similarly, his successor, Kurt Waldheim, was a consistent opponent of the continuation of the war in Vietnam, although his power to act was severely limited.[3] In addition, the UN Security Council did pass Resolution 189 condemning American soldiers crossing the border to Cambodia while preparing new attacks in neighboring Vietnam. Thus, while no official resolution was passed, we argue that the classification of Vietnam as an illegitimate war is justified.

In contrast, classifying wars as legitimate is straightforward. In the case of Korea (UNSC Resolutions 82, 83, 84, among others), the Gulf War (UNSC 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 670 and others), Somalia (UNSC 751, 767, 775, 794, among others; UNGA 47-160), Haiti (UNSC 841, 875, 917, 940, among others; UNGA 49-27, 49-201), Bosnia (UNSC 816, 819, 942, 958, among others; UNGA 47-121, 48-88), and Kosovo (UNSC 1239, 1244, among others; UNGA 54-183) explicit resolutions exist. World War II is somewhat more difficult to assess, as the United Nations was founded in 1946, after the war had ended. However, the United Nations paved the way for the Nuremberg Trials by way of the General Assembly Resolutions 28 and 95 and thus implicitly made its position clear. Generally, we argue that classifying U.S. intervention in World War II as legitimate is largely uncontroversial.

[2] "Chastising the U.N." New York Times, August 4th 1972

[3] "Waldheim and Bush Meet After Criticism by Nixon" New York Times, July 29th 1972

1.2 Approach 2: Newspaper Articles

The idea Our theory suggests that wars fought abroad affect the homicide rate at home. Specifically, we expect that homicide rates will increase with illegitimate wars, while they will be unaffected by legitimate wars. For such an effect to exist, individuals must have a sense of what the war is about. For this reason, we examined how U.S. media reported on the legitimacy of a particular war. Editorials in major newspapers are likely to capture the knowledge and judgements of citizens.

Process To code newspaper articles, it is first necessary to establish the sample of newspapers. We chose to examine the editorials about each conflict published in both The New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. These newspapers were chosen for several reasons: 1) the represent a major left-leaning and a major right-leaning newspaper, giving us access to a broad range of opinions; 2) they were both in circulation during the entirety of our time series; and, 3) it is reasonable to assume that the views in each newspaper assume a leadership position within the U.S. media landscape, thereby shaping the opinions reflected in other publications.

In a second step, we needed to identify the relevant newspaper articles. We chose search terms that would return the highest number of editorials in both publications. Several search terms were rejected due to the fact that they did not return any results; the ones used returned at least one article for each search term between the two publications. Our search criteria were straightforward:

1. The article was an editorial.

2. The article appeared during the duration of the war.

3. The same search terms were used for each war in each publication, in order to preserve comparisons between newspapers. The search terms and years used for

each war are as follows:

- World War II (1939-1945): "World War II", "World War 2", "WWII", "Second World War"
- Korean War (1950-1953): "Korean War"
- Vietnam War (1955-1975): "Vietnam War", "War in Vietnam"
- Lebanon Crisis (1958): "Lebanon Crisis", "Operation Blue Bat"
- Dominican Republic (1965): "Dominican Civil War", "Dominican Republic AND Occupation"
- Panama (1989-1990): "Panama Invasion", "Invasion of Panama", "Operation Just Cause"
- Gulf War (1990-1991): "Gulf War", "Desert Storm"
- Bosnian War (1992-1995): "Bosnian War", "Balkan War", "Yugoslav War"
- Haiti (1994-1995): "Haiti Occupation", "Haiti Invasion"
- Somali Civil War (1992-1994): "United Task Force AND Somalia", "War AND Somalia"
- Kosovo War (1998-1999): "Kosovo War", "War in Kosovo"

This resulted in 2,191 opinion articles. In a third step, we identified the relevant articles for coding. For this reason, we read all editorials once in order to determine if they actually concerned the war in question or merely mentioned the search term in an unrelated context. For example, an article describing Elvis Presley's music career might mention the Vietnam War, but would clearly not be directly relevant for an evaluation of that war. We consequently excluded such articles. In addition, hand-coding articles requires both manpower and time, both of which are in limited supply. For two wars, even well-defined and limited search criteria returned an excess of five hundred articles. Given

this number of articles, manually coding all editorials related to Vietnam War and Koran War was impossible. For these wars, we created a random sample of all editorials to yield a subsample consisting of about a quarter of all articles. The final sample included 722 articles for all wars, between 12 and 156 articles per war.

Once the final sample was determined, articles were manually coded as belonging in one of three categories: legitimate, illegitimate, and neutral. Determination was made based on the tone of the article, as well as specific statements. For example, an article that reported factual information about a skirmish or discussed rationing would be considered a neutral editorial. Those that specifically questioned government intervention, policies, or decisions related to the conflict were coded as supporting evidence for an illegitimate war. And those that used positive and supportive language, especially about politicians, military decisions, and government behavior, were coded as supporting evidence for a legitimate war.

The manual coding of newspaper articles is a time- and resource-intensive undertaking. For this reason, the coding was conducted by two members of the research team, instead of simply one member. To ensure that both members consistently code newspaper articles, we took several precautions. First, before starting the coding process, we jointly worked on identifying the classification criteria to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate wars. Thus, it was not the case that one of the coders simply received a coding sheet by someone else, but rather all coders were intimately familiar with the coding criteria. Second, due to the large number of editorials and the time-constraints faced by the research team, not all wars were coded by both researchers. However, to ensure that consistent coding was applied, we conducted a prior check for initial validation. Specifically, the two members of the research team coded all articles related to two wars. Here, we selected one legitimate and one illegitimate war (as judged by United Nations resolutions and foreign aid numbers) to establish a) that coding newspaper articles would

be an appropriate way to actually measure legitimacy, and b) to establish that the two coders used the agreed coding criteria in a consistent manner. After each article related to these wars was coded independently, the two researchers met to compare notes. 90% of the articles were coded identically. Note that our coding scheme offers three possible classifications: "Legitimate," "neutral," or "illegitimate." In those few instances where the coding disagreed, disagreements were only of the sort were one coder classified an article as "legitimate/illegitimate" and the other coder classified the same article as "neutral." In no instance did one coder classify an article as "legitimate" while the other coder identified the same article as "illegitimate." In light of these findings, we felt reasonably certain that the coding was similar across researchers. The remaining wars were then split up between the two coders and coded independently. Weekly meetings were held with all members of the research team to ensure coding patterns were consistent with the ideas of legitimacy and illegitimacy as defined in our paper.

Results The results of our coding efforts are summarized in Table B. The classification of most wars is uncontroversial. For instance, in the case of World War II, Korea, Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo the number of articles classifying these wars as legitimate clearly outnumbers the number of articles suggesting that these wars are illegitimate. Similarly, in the case of Vietnam and Lebanon the number of articles classifying these wars as illegitimate clearly outnumbers the number of articles suggesting that these wars are legitimate. For three wars, however, this is not quite as clear-cut. Based on our measures using UN votes and foreign aid data, we would expect that the military operations in Dominican Republic and Panama would be illegitimate, while Haiti would be a legitimate war. However, the newspaper counts do not mirror these judgements. For example, 11 articles suggest that Panama was a legitimate war while only 3 argue it was not. Similarly, 17 articles suggest that Haiti was an illegitimate war while only 16

suggest it was legitimate. It is noteworthy, however, that these three wars feature the lowest number of newspaper articles which may affect the accuracy by which they capture the general mood in the country.

Importantly, however, the classification of wars is remarkably consistent across newspapers. Both the left-leaning New York Time and the right-leaning Wall Street Journal yield consistent evaluations of these wars.

War	Total				New York Times				Wall Street Journal			
	Legitimate	Neutral	Illegitimate	N	Legitimate	Neutral	Illegitimate	N	Legitimate	Neutral	Illegitimate	N
World War II	60	60	4	124	57	2	50	109	3	2	10	15
Korea	68	51	10	129	54	4	34	92	14	6	17	37
Lebanon	0	12	22	34	0	0	3	3	0	22	8	13
Vietnam	6	80	70	156	2	52	75	129	4	18	12	34
Dominican Republic	4	8	0	12	2	0	5	7	2	0	3	5
Panama	11	10	3	24	2	2	4	8	9	1	7	17
Gulf War	26	33	1	60	26	1	32	59	0	0	1	1
Somalia	26	23	13	52	26	13	20	59	0	0	3	3
Haiti	16	13	17	46	15	15	11	41	1	2	1	4
Bosnia	21	15	3	39	15	3	12	30	6	0	3	9
Kosovo	20	11	5	36	18	5	9	32	2	0	2	4

Table B. Number of newspaper articles that suggest a particular war is legitimate or not. In the majority of wars, the findings are consistent with our classification of wars shown in Table 1 of the main manuscript.

1.3 Approach 3: Foreign Aid

The idea Our third approach to identifying which wars are legitimate versus illegitimate relies on the behavior of other state actors. The idea is straightforward: We analyze the share of foreign aid the United States provides to the enemy country after the war. Such aid is typically intended to help re-build the country. The international community is likely to share the costs of rebuilding a nation if it views a war as legitimate. In contrast, other donors are unlikely willing to pay for the destruction caused by an illegitimate war, leave the U.S. to foot the majority of the bill. Following this reasoning, we argue that the share of foreign aid provided by the United States relative to the contributions of other western donors is a proxy for a war's legitimacy: The higher the share of total aid provided by the U.S., the less likely that the war was legitimate.

Results We obtain data of foreign aid flows by donor countries from the OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) International Development Statistics. The data include official development aid (ODA) provided by all 34 OECD member countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These data are available from 1960 onwards. As a result, we are unable to calculate the share of U.S. aid provided to three wars that ended prior to 1960.

We use total ODA (in U.S. dollar) to calculate the share of foreign aid provided by the United States. We then identify the average share of U.S. foreign aid provided in the year the war ended as well as one year after the war ended (to account for lags in disbursements of aid, as well as the fact that some wars ended in January while others ended in December of the previous year). Table C presents the average share of total

	% of total aid provided by U.S. after war	Judgement
Vietnam	84.17%	not legitimate
Dominican Republic	99.60%	not legitimate
Panama	93.53%	not legitimate
Gulf War	38.83%	legitimate
Somalia	28.90%	legitimate
Haiti	59.67%	legitimate
Bosnia	14.65%	legitimate
Kosovo	11.68%	legitimate

Table C. Share of total foreign aid provided to recipient country after U.S. military intervention. The international community is likely to share the costs of rebuilding a nation if it views a war as legitimate. In contrast, other donors are unlikely willing to pay for the destruction caused by an illegitimate war, leave the U.S. to foot the majority of the bill.

foreign aid provided by the U.S. in these years. The data show that the U.S. provided almost all foreign aid to Vietnam, Dominican Republic, and Panama after the conclusion of their military interventions in these countries. Based on the rationale outlined above, these wars are likely illegitimate. In contrast, the other donors provided a significantly share of foreign aid to other war torn countries, such as Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Based on the criteria summarized above, these wars would be considered legitimate.

2 Findings

2.1 Visual summary of main results

Figure 2 visualizes the main results in the article. The estimation results on which this figure is based are presented below.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
World War II	0.074										
	(0.051)										
Dummy: other wars	0.013										
	(0.017)										
Korea		0.041									
		(0.069)									
Dummy: other wars		0.015									
		(0.019)									
Vietnam			0.103*								
			(0.009)								
Dummy: other wars			0.000								
			(0.010)								
Lebanon				0.045*							
				(0.012)							
Dummy: other wars				0.027							
				(0.021)							
Dominican Republic					0.082*						
					(0.011)						
Dummy: other wars					0.024						
					(0.021)						
Panama						0.075*					
						(0.011)					
Dummy: other wars						0.026					
						(0.021)					
Gulf War							0.027				
							(0.022)				
Dummy: other wars							0.016				
							(0.019)				
Somalia								-0.143*			
								(0.054)			
Dummy: other wars								0.055*			
								(0.021)			
Haiti									-0.118*		
									(0.054)		
Dummy: other wars									0.048*		
									(0.021)		
Bosnia										-0.084	
										(0.068)	
Dummy: other wars										0.042	
										(0.022)	
Kosovo											-0.043*
											(0.008)
Dummy: other wars											0.021
											(0.021)
Real income per capita	0.469	0.481	0.187	0.416	0.414	0.424	0.479	0.431	0.460	0.420	0.449
	(0.247)	(0.257)	(0.287)	(0.262)	(0.262)	(0.262)	(0.258)	(0.256)	(0.250)	(0.263)	(0.258)
Unemployment rate	0.118*	0.119*	0.079	0.120*	0.120*	0.119*	0.117*	0.122*	0.125*	0.117*	0.116*
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.061)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.049)
Inflation	0.557*	0.528*	0.273	0.487*	0.494*	0.467*	0.523*	0.612*	0.596*	0.576*	0.523*
	(0.254)	(0.264)	(0.407)	(0.220)	(0.220)	(0.222)	(0.260)	(0.226)	(0.229)	(0.237)	(0.259)
Share of young population	-0.003	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Welfare State assistance per capita	-0.046	-0.049	-0.067	-0.083*	-0.079*	-0.083*	-0.050	-0.059	-0.058	-0.056	-0.050
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Cold War dummy	0.038*	0.032	0.021*	0.036*	0.035*	0.036*	0.033	0.021	0.025	0.024	0.031
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Constant	-0.024	-0.044	-0.010	-0.047	-0.042	-0.049	-0.039	-0.024	-0.035	-0.023	-0.034
	(0.075)	(0.082)	(0.037)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.076)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.073)
AIC	-229.026	-227.772	-255.974	-222.819	-223.750	-223.486	-227.590	-234.780	-232.783	-230.689	-229.189
BIC	-202.8239	-201.5697	-222.6254	-201.3805	-202.3118	-202.048	-201.3882	-208.5779	-206.581	-204.4862	-202.9866

Table D. Estimation results for the effect of international wars on the domestic homicide rate in the United States. Note that the model with the best fit (judged by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) statistics, as well as model parsimony) is reported for each war. Standard Errors in parentheses. * $p<0.05$.

2.2 Comparing minor wars only

Figure 2 summarizes our main results: Legitimate wars do not increase homicide rates while illegitimate wars do. This figure includes all wars that the United States fought since 1928. However, it is possible to argue that we are comparing apples to oranges when comparing major wars to minor wars. After all, the effect of major wars might be significantly different from minor wars.

We offer two responses. First, we explicitly test the alternative hypothesis that larger wars (measured by the number of returning veterans, or the number of troops deployed) have a different effect on homicide rates than smaller wars. The results — presented in Table 4 — suggest that variation in the size of war does not explain the variation in wars' effects on homicide rates. Similarly, variation in the number of deaths does not explain the variation in wars' effects on homicide rates (see Table 5).

We acknowledge, however, that the presentation of these findings in the main article can lead to the conclusion that we are comparing apples to oranges. For this reason, this section presents the findings by comparing only apples to apples. For instance, Figure A compares only short wars, that is, wars lasting two years or less. Even if comparing wars of the same duration, the substantive interpretation remains unchanged: Illegitimate wars increase homicide rates while legitimate wars do not.

However, duration is only one way to differentiate between small and large wars. For this reason, Figure B compares minor wars as measured by their death toll. Here, only wars with a death toll below 20,000 are considered. However, the substantive interpretation remains the same: Even if comparing apples to apples, that is, only small wars to each other, the findings suggest that legitimate wars have no effect on domestic homicide rates while illegitimate wars do.



Note: Figure displays effect of only short wars on domestic homicides, that is, wars lasting 2 years or less. Even if comparing wars of the same duration, the substantive interpretation remains unchanged: Illegitimate wars increase homicide rates while legitimate wars do not.

Figure A. Homicide Rates and wars with short duration



Note: Figure displays effect of only small wars on domestic homicides, that is, wars with death tolls below 20,000. Even if comparing wars of the same magnitude, the substantive interpretation remains unchanged: Illegitimate wars increase homicide rates while legitimate wars do not.

Figure B. Homicide Rates and wars with few casualties

3 Robustness tests

3.1 Review of existing literature

The main analysis presented in the manuscript includes several controlled variables. Specifically, we controlled for the real income per capita, the unemployment rate, inflation, the proportion of individuals aged 15 to 24 in the total population, welfare assistance per capita provided by the U.S. government, and a dummy for the Cold War context.

However, as noted in the article, a large number of possible factors may affect domestic homicide rates. The limited number of observations available for our study limited the number of control variables we were able to incorporate into the analysis. However, we acknowledge that other factors may also play a role. In particular, a full set of control variables would include: a) economic factors; b) opportunity factors; c) cultural factors; and, d) issues of governance. In the following section, we discuss which variables the literature has suggested in each of these categories.

Economic Factors: Scholars have repeatedly suggested that violence may be the result of economic stress (Chiricos 1987; Devine, Sheley, and Smith 1988; Hsieh and Pugh 1993; Marvell and Moody 1997, 1999). There are four different ways in which scholars have thought about how structural economic factors might be related to homicides. First, the income of individuals might affect homicide rates, though the direction of the effect is unclear. On the one hand, a purely economic perspective suggests that individuals with better economic prospects should commit fewer homicides. After all, with increased income, violent acts become less attractive relative to other opportunities (Cornwell and Trumbull 1994; Piliavin et al. 1986). On the other hand, however, modernization theory predicts that economic growth disrupts established forms of social organization (Durkheim 1964). The lack of role models and social relations, then, might lead to higher

rates of homicide. We operationalize these notions by including the real income per capita to account for income levels. Data are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Second, unemployment might matter, as it reduces legitimate labor market opportunities. For this reason, unemployed individuals have a higher tendency to resort to illegitimate means for survival and thus a higher likelihood of homicide (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 2002). We control for the percent of the population unemployed in a given year to control for this possibility. Data come from the Federal Reserve Bulletin. Third, we control for inflation, as rising prices might increase societal discontent, resulting in higher homicides. Data are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Fourth, inequality is thought to increase homicide rates. Relative deprivation is a source of frustration and anger, which might unload itself in criminal behavior towards wealthier individuals (Hagan and Peterson 1995; Neuman and Berger 1988). We operationalize this notion in two ways: On the one hand, we include the share of income obtained by the top 10% of the population to control for relative inequality. On the other hand, we control for the average income levels of the top 10% and the bottom 90% to account for absolute differences in income between the rich and the poor. These variables are obtained from Piketty (2014).

Demographic Factors: Certain population characteristics might also be conducive to homicide rates. In particular, younger individuals are overrepresented among homicide offenders. Thus, homicide rates might increases following an increase in the share of the youth in the population (Cohen and Felson 1979; Farrington 1986; Neumayer 2003). We consequently include the proportion of young individuals aged 15 to 24 in the total population obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. In addition, some scholars suggest that homicide rates are higher in urban areas due to increased opportunities for criminal behavior and reduced risk of punishment in these areas (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 2002). Therefore, we control for the percentage of the population living in urban areas. Lastly, we control for the overall population in the United States. As the land-mass

of the U.S. does not change in the period under consideration, this effectively controls for population density, which is thought to increase the likelihood of societal interactions, and thus homicide.

Cultural Factors: Social norms can be powerful instruments of control and thus might affect homicide rates. Our research design explaining the variation in a single country over time controls for time-invariant aspects of culture. Yet, capturing cultural aspects in quantitative studies is a challenge which we address using three control variables. First, increases in female labor force participation have been linked to a lack of social or ethical standards in society. The decision of women to work has been suggested as a disruption to traditional family structures, resulting in a window of opportunity for deviant behavior of unsupervised people (Cohen and Felson 1979; Gartner and Parker 1990). We account for this possibility by controlling for the percentage of female workers in the workforce. A second measure capturing increased anomie is the divorce rate, which may represent the erosion of traditional values formerly providing stability to potential perpetrators. Both variables were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. Lastly, social norms imposed by religion might prevent homicides. In particular, certain religions might be more constraining than others (Groves, McCleary, and Newman 1985). For example, the focus on individuality implicit in Protestantism is thought to be less restrictive than other schools of thought. We account for this possibility by controlling for the percentage of the population adhering to different religions, including Protestantism, Catholicism, Judaism, and a number of smaller religions.[4]

Governance: Lastly, we account for issues of governance. For example, an individual's incentive to engage in violent crimes might be particularly strong if crime represents the only means for survival. Conversely, if the state provides welfare assistance to the needy and thereby ensures survival without the need for violent actions, we should see homicide

[4]Note that we do not control for the share of the population adhering to no religion to serve as the quasi-base category.

rates decline. To account for this possibility we control for the welfare assistance per capita provided by the U.S. government. In addition, external security environment of the United States changed over time. In particular, the context of the Cold War may have shaped the perception of U.S. violence abroad. We account for this by including a dummy variable set to one between 1947–1991.

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Real income per capita (USD)	5435.1	2758.1	1527.7	10491.1
Unemployment rate (in %)	5.8	1.6	2.9	9.7
Top 10% income share (in %)	38.6	5.8	32.3	50.6
Top 10% income level (USD)	166770.0	56477.8	82595.3	271867.0
Bottom 90% income level (USD)	31024.3	4939.5	18004.1	36956.9
Inflation (in %)	0.6	0.4	0.1	1.4
Share of young population (in %)	15.4	1.9	13.0	19.0
Urbanization (in %)	74.3	5.0	62.5	81.2
Total population (in mio.)	230	497	146	316
Female labor force participation (in %)	48.1	8.8	32.7	58.9
Divorce rate (per 1000 marriages)	371.1	103.3	211.3	528.6
Share of Catholics (in %)	25.2	2.1	21.0	29.0
Share of Jews (in %)	2.5	0.7	1.0	4.0
Share of other religions (in %)	13.2	9.0	1.0	36.0
Share of Protestants (in %)	59.2	8.3	38.0	71.0
Welfare state assistance per capita (USD)	448.7	299.2	52.1	1264.5
Cold War dummy	0.7	0.5	0	1

Table E. Summary statistics of control variables used in this study.

3.2 Overfitted model

Given the large number of factors with the potential to explain trends in U.S. domestic homicide rates, we would ideally like to control for all of them. However, our methodological approach — analyzing the time series of a single country between 1928-2014 — only offers 87 observations. Therefore, including too many control variables would result in an overfitted model with possibly inaccurate estimates. For this reason, we include only the most important control variables.

However, as a robustness test, we re-estimate the model with an expanded set of control variables, despite the possibility of overfitting. Table F presents the findings. Our findings are generally robust to the inclusion of additional control variables: Of the 11 wars analyzed, only the coefficient for Lebanon changes significantly. However, as noted above, including too many control variables may result in possibly inaccurate estimates.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
World War II	0.038										
	(0.061)										
Dummy: other wars	0.009										
	(0.019)										
Korea		0.040									
		(0.056)									
Dummy: other wars		0.009									
		(0.018)									
Vietnam			0.078*								
			(0.014)								
Dummy: other wars			-0.003								
			(0.007)								
Lebanon				-0.002							
				(0.019)							
Dummy: other wars				0.012							
				(0.017)							
Dominican Republic					0.092*						
					(0.013)						
Dummy: other wars					0.007						
					(0.015)						
Panama						0.036*					
						(0.013)					
Dummy: other wars						0.011					
						(0.017)					
Gulf War							0.017				
							(0.028)				
Dummy: other wars							0.010				
							(0.018)				
Somalia								-0.138*			
								(0.053)			
Dummy: other wars								0.048*			
								(0.017)			
Haiti									-0.125*		
									(0.057)		
Dummy: other wars									0.041*		
									(0.018)		
Bosnia										-0.073	
										(0.068)	
Dummy: other wars										0.032	
										(0.019)	
Kosovo											-0.040
											(0.027)
Dummy: other wars											0.013
											(0.019)
Real income per capita	0.704	0.725	0.620	0.202	0.204	0.238	0.715	0.651	0.743	0.649	0.599
	(0.432)	(0.435)	(0.452)	(0.433)	(0.418)	(0.416)	(0.431)	(0.488)	(0.496)	(0.466)	(0.445)
Unemployment rate	0.066	0.066	0.070	0.049	0.048	0.051	0.062	0.076	0.078	0.066	0.062
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.055)
Inflation	0.837*	0.848*	0.712*	0.595*	0.625*	0.594*	0.819*	0.880*	0.902*	0.838*	0.789*
	(0.296)	(0.316)	(0.243)	(0.228)	(0.227)	(0.227)	(0.296)	(0.281)	(0.305)	(0.279)	(0.294)
Share of young population	-0.009	-0.009	-0.022*	-0.013*	-0.013*	-0.013*	-0.009	-0.011*	-0.010*	-0.010	-0.009
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Welfare State assistance per capita	-0.038	-0.039	-0.026	-0.064*	-0.056*	-0.065*	-0.040	-0.044	-0.042	-0.044	-0.042
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Cold War dummy	0.049*	0.044	0.044*	0.059*	0.056*	0.057*	0.044	0.033	0.036	0.037	0.044*
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.021)
Top 10% income share	0.364	0.409	0.210	0.211	0.333	0.203	0.373	0.401	0.432	0.387	0.382
	(0.234)	(0.239)	(0.253)	(0.241)	(0.210)	(0.240)	(0.232)	(0.225)	(0.233)	(0.226)	(0.234)
Top 10% income level	-0.318	-0.357	-0.407	-0.220	-0.324	-0.219	-0.336	-0.297	-0.340	-0.329	-0.312
	(0.204)	(0.199)	(0.227)	(0.201)	(0.185)	(0.202)	(0.199)	(0.208)	(0.215)	(0.206)	(0.199)
Bottom 90% income level	-0.251	-0.306	-0.376	-0.151	-0.088	-0.165	-0.314	-0.278	-0.288	-0.285	-0.236
	(0.308)	(0.241)	(0.256)	(0.267)	(0.253)	(0.263)	(0.241)	(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.242)	(0.245)
Urbanization	-0.703	0.083	3.828*	0.932	0.882	0.847	0.107	0.432	0.534	0.194	-0.022
	(3.427)	(2.553)	(1.050)	(1.670)	(1.674)	(1.688)	(2.574)	(1.967)	(2.041)	(2.123)	(2.409)
Total population	0.183	-0.075	-6.390*	-2.870	-2.610	-2.640	0.327	-1.830	-1.593	-0.929	0.188
	(3.635)	(3.659)	(2.226)	(2.294)	(2.303)	(2.380)	(3.674)	(3.462)	(3.767)	(3.535)	(3.544)
Female labor force participation	-0.146	-0.047	0.392	0.018	0.020	0.012	-0.079	-0.006	-0.058	-0.036	-0.065
	(0.364)	(0.291)	(0.395)	(0.339)	(0.340)	(0.339)	(0.296)	(0.305)	(0.291)	(0.307)	(0.298)
Divorce rate	0.328*	0.354*	0.595*	0.532*	0.539*	0.518*	0.353*	0.307*	0.303*	0.337*	0.358*
	(0.151)	(0.146)	(0.124)	(0.127)	(0.121)	(0.123)	(0.143)	(0.117)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.145)
Share of Catholics	0.098	0.125	0.048	0.126	0.115	0.124	0.100	0.183	0.216*	0.144	0.064
	(0.108)	(0.114)	(0.109)	(0.119)	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.103)	(0.101)
Share of Jews	0.038	0.040	0.055	0.043	0.041	0.043	0.040	0.042	0.041	0.040	0.039
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.039)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Share of other religions	-0.014	-0.011	-0.014	0.017	0.011	0.017	-0.014	-0.002	-0.004	-0.006	-0.015
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Share of Protestants	0.018	0.035	0.153	0.151	0.134	0.151	0.031	0.172	0.105	0.125	-0.068
	(0.158)	(0.149)	(0.156)	(0.189)	(0.180)	(0.187)	(0.152)	(0.195)	(0.189)	(0.186)	(0.149)
Constant	0.065	0.063	0.318*	0.171*	0.172*	0.159*	0.054	0.116	0.097	0.099	0.062
	(0.112)	(0.115)	(0.086)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.116)	(0.101)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.110)
AIC	-221.834	-221.987	-248.339	-220.663	-223.155	-220.839	-221.699	-228.168	-227.052	-223.892	-222.649
BIC	-169.4293	-169.5828	-188.788	-173.0225	-175.5144	-173.1984	-169.2939	-175.763	-174.647	-171.4879	-170.2444

Table F. Robustness test including many additional control variables. Note that the model is likely over-fitted. However, the findings are robust to the inclusion of additional controls. Standard Errors in parentheses. * $p<0.05$.

3.3 Factor models

Clearly, estimating an overfitted model is not ideal. Yet, it is equally undesirable to lose information contained in the additional control variables. For this reason, we pursue a second approach to incorporating additional control variables in our analysis. We use factor analysis to combine several control variables and re-estimating our model with these factor variables only. We estimate two versions of such factor models, presented in Tables G and H, combining the additional control variables in different combinations. The list of factors calculated and their components is as follows:

- Factor Economics A: combines real income per capita, inflation, and the unemployment rate.
- Factor Economics B: combines top 10% income level, bottom 90% income level, and top 10% income share.
- Factor Economics C: combines real income per capita, inflation, the unemployment rate, top 10% income level, bottom 90% income level, and top 10% income share.
- Factor Demographics: combines share of young population, urbanization, and total population.
- Factor Culture A: combines female labor force participation and divorce rate.
- Factor Culture B: combines share of Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and other religions.
- Factor Culture C: combines female labor force participation, divorce rate, share of Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and other religions.
- Factor Governance: combines welfare state assistance per capita and Cold War dummy.

Our substantive findings — homicide rates increase with illegitimate wars but not legitimate wars —- are robust to including the factors as additional control variables.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
World War II	-0.032										
	(0.095)										
Dummy: other wars	0.011										
	(0.017)										
Korea		0.021									
		(0.061)									
Dummy: other wars		0.008									
		(0.017)									
Vietnam			0.100*								
			(0.016)								
Dummy: other wars			-0.001								
			(0.008)								
Lebanon				0.022							
				(0.019)							
Dummy: other wars				0.021							
				(0.022)							
Dominican Republic					0.112*						
					(0.013)						
Dummy: other wars					0.014						
					(0.019)						
Panama						0.079*					
						(0.011)					
Dummy: other wars						0.019					
						(0.021)					
Gulf War							0.030				
							(0.030)				
Dummy: other wars							0.008				
							(0.016)				
Somalia								-0.131*			
								(0.054)			
Dummy: other wars								0.043			
								(0.024)			
Haiti									-0.081		
									(0.060)		
Dummy: other wars									0.030		
									(0.026)		
Bosnia										-0.091	
										(0.061)	
Dummy: other wars										0.034	
										(0.024)	
Kosovo											-0.052*
											(0.021)
Dummy: other wars											0.012
											(0.019)
Factor Economics A: income and unemployment	-0.006	-0.009	0.001	-0.012	-0.011	-0.012	-0.008	-0.010	-0.009	-0.008	-0.010
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Factor Economics B: inequality	-0.023	-0.017	-0.037*	-0.024	-0.027	-0.023	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017	-0.019	-0.015
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Factor Demographics: All controls	0.024	0.019	0.015*	0.017	0.018	0.017	0.020	0.012	0.015	0.014	0.019
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Factor Culture A: Morals	0.020	0.016	0.017	0.024	0.024*	0.024*	0.016	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.015
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Factor Culture B: Religion	-0.003	-0.002	-0.005	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Factor Governance: All controls	-0.002	-0.001	0.006	0.004	0.004	0.004	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	0.003	-0.000	-0.008	-0.004	-0.002	-0.004	0.000	-0.009	-0.006	-0.006	-0.001
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
AIC	-217.591	-217.270	-236.296	-209.167	-211.636	-210.189	-217.404	-221.854	-219.332	-219.808	-218.516
BIC	-191.3885	-191.0682	-202.9472	-187.7286	-190.1979	-188.7507	-191.2018	-195.6522	-193.1293	-193.6054	-192.3135

Table G. Robustness test including six factor variables summarizing additional control variables to circumvent the problem of over-fitting. Note that the findings are robust to the inclusion of these factors. Standard Errors in parentheses. * $p<0.05$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
World War II	0.030										
	(0.079)										
Dummy: other wars	0.009										
	(0.017)										
Korea		0.018									
		(0.063)									
Dummy: other wars		0.009									
		(0.018)									
Vietnam			0.090*								
			(0.007)								
Dummy: other wars			-0.005								
			(0.007)								
Lebanon				0.026							
				(0.016)							
Dummy: other wars				0.027							
				(0.025)							
Dominican Republic					0.108*						
					(0.013)						
Dummy: other wars					0.021						
					(0.023)						
Panama						0.083*					
						(0.012)					
Dummy: other wars						0.025					
						(0.024)					
Gulf War							0.031				
							(0.031)				
Dummy: other wars							0.009				
							(0.017)				
Somalia								-0.143*			
								(0.062)			
Dummy: other wars								0.048			
								(0.027)			
Haiti									-0.090		
									(0.065)		
Dummy: other wars									0.034		
									(0.027)		
Bosnia										-0.100	
										(0.070)	
Dummy: other wars										0.037	
										(0.026)	
Kosovo											-0.052*
											(0.016)
Dummy: other wars											0.014
											(0.020)
Factor Economics C: All controls	-0.015	-0.015	-0.014*	-0.017	-0.018	-0.017	-0.015	-0.018	-0.017	-0.018	-0.015
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Factor Demographics: All controls	0.014	0.015	0.001	0.008	0.009	0.008	0.016	0.008	0.010	0.010	0.014
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Factor Culture C: All controls	0.004	0.004	0.006	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Factor Governance: All controls	-0.000	-0.001	0.016*	0.007	0.007	0.007	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Constant	-0.003	-0.002	-0.014*	-0.010	-0.009	-0.010	-0.002	-0.013	-0.010	-0.009	-0.003
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
AIC	-219.219	-219.096	-245.330	-208.022	-209.874	-208.911	-219.258	-224.246	-221.658	-221.945	-220.466
BIC	-197.7809	-197.6577	-216.7454	-191.3482	-193.1996	-192.2368	-197.8193	-202.8076	-200.2199	-200.5063	-199.0276

Table H. Robustness test including four factor variables summarizing additional control variables to circumvent the problem of over-fitting. Note that the findings are robust to the inclusion of these factors. Standard Errors in parentheses. * $p<0.05$.

3.4 Control for percentage of unemployed by age group

Existing literature suggests that homicides are largely the purview of male perpetrators. Moreover, young males are the most likely to perpetrate violent crimes. Our models, however, control for society's demographic make-up and its economic conditions separately. It might be worthwhile, therefore, to combine the measures of economic conditions with the demographic make-up variables to create a more robust at-risk group. For instance, the proportion of unemployed young men may be a better covariate to control for than unemployment and proportion of youth separately. Following these considerations, we obtain data on male unemployment from two sources:

- Male Unemployment Rate Ages 15–24. These data were obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) hosted by the St. Louis Federal reserve bank. The data are available between 1960 – 2016. Due to the late starting point of this time series we are unable to include this control variable for World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Lebanon. The findings are available in Table I.

- Male Unemployment Rate Ages 15–24. The data source is the International Labor Organization (ILO). Data are available for 1960 – 2016. Due to the late starting point of this time series we are unable to include this control variable for World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Lebanon. The findings are available in Table J.

Irrespective of which operationalization we use, our results are robust to the inclusion of controls pertaining to the most important at-risk group.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Dominican Republic	0.039*						
	(0.013)						
Dummy: other wars	-0.005						
	(0.014)						
Panama		0.028*					
		(0.013)					
Dummy: other wars		-0.003					
		(0.014)					
Gulf War			-0.002				
			(0.018)				
Dummy: other wars			-0.005				
			(0.013)				
Somalia				-0.082			
				(0.070)			
Dummy: other wars				0.018			
				(0.026)			
Haiti					-0.039		
					(0.054)		
Dummy: other wars					0.006		
					(0.023)		
Bosnia						-0.033	
						(0.076)	
Dummy: other wars						0.003	
						(0.025)	
Kosovo							-0.069*
							(0.013)
Dummy: other wars							0.001
							(0.015)
Real income per capita	-0.903*	-0.830*	-0.590	-0.532	-0.568	-0.597	-0.729*
	(0.372)	(0.378)	(0.362)	(0.316)	(0.330)	(0.336)	(0.318)
Inflation	-0.138	-0.132	0.046	0.138	0.087	0.064	-0.019
	(0.259)	(0.261)	(0.300)	(0.287)	(0.291)	(0.285)	(0.277)
Welfare State assistance per capita	-0.040	-0.042	-0.030	-0.032	-0.031	-0.032	-0.031
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Cold War dummy	0.054*	0.053*	0.050*	0.039	0.046	0.046	0.048*
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.020)
Male Unemployment Rate Ages 15-24, 1960 - 2016	-0.010*	-0.010*	-0.009*	-0.008*	-0.009*	-0.009*	-0.010*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	0.130*	0.128*	0.104	0.088	0.096	0.102	0.120*
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.050)
AIC	-170.001	-169.593	-178.714	-181.023	-179.322	-179.019	-182.311
BIC	-154.0892	-153.6807	-158.8245	-161.1333	-159.4317	-159.1288	-162.4214

Table I. Robustness test controlling for the at-risk group for committing homicides (young, unemployed, male individuals) using Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Note that the data start only in 1960, which is why only wars beginning after 1960 are considered. The findings are robust to the inclusion of this control variable. Standard Errors in parentheses. * $p<0.05$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Dominican Republic	0.039*						
	(0.013)						
Dummy: other wars	-0.005						
	(0.014)						
Panama		0.028*					
		(0.013)					
Dummy: other wars		-0.003					
		(0.014)					
Gulf War			-0.002				
			(0.018)				
Dummy: other wars			-0.005				
			(0.013)				
Somalia				-0.082			
				(0.069)			
Dummy: other wars				0.018			
				(0.026)			
Haiti					-0.040		
					(0.054)		
Dummy: other wars					0.006		
					(0.023)		
Bosnia						-0.032	
						(0.076)	
Dummy: other wars						0.003	
						(0.025)	
Kosovo							-0.069*
							(0.013)
Dummy: other wars							0.001
							(0.015)
Real income per capita	-0.908*	-0.836*	-0.594	-0.536	-0.573	-0.601	-0.734*
	(0.371)	(0.377)	(0.364)	(0.318)	(0.331)	(0.337)	(0.319)
Inflation	-0.141	-0.135	0.043	0.135	0.084	0.061	-0.023
	(0.258)	(0.260)	(0.300)	(0.287)	(0.290)	(0.285)	(0.277)
Welfare State assistance per capita	-0.040	-0.042	-0.030	-0.032	-0.031	-0.032	-0.031
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Cold War dummy	0.054*	0.053*	0.050*	0.039	0.046	0.046	0.048*
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.020)
Male Unemployment Rate Ages 15-24, 1960-2016	-0.010*	-0.010*	-0.009*	-0.008*	-0.009*	-0.009*	-0.010*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	0.131*	0.130*	0.106	0.089	0.097	0.103	0.121*
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.051)
AIC	-170.195	-169.793	-178.796	-181.085	-179.427	-179.084	-182.410
BIC	-154.2827	-153.881	-158.9058	-161.1951	-159.5375	-159.194	-162.5202

Table J. Robustness test controlling for the at-risk group for committing homicides (young, unemployed, male individuals) using Data from the International Labor Organization. Note that the data start only in 1960, which is why only wars beginning after 1960 are considered. The findings are robust to the inclusion of this control variable. Standard Errors in parentheses. * $p<0.05$.

3.5 Control for divorce rate

As noted above, our main analysis includes only a subset of potential control variables, as the number of observations (87) limits the number of control variables that can be included in the models. Instead, while we choose to include the most important ones, judgements may differ regarding which variables should be included. The factor analyses presented in Section 3.3 should alleviate some concerns. However, closer analysis of Table F shows that the divorce rate is significant in all the models that include additional controls. Against this background, it would be worthwhile to examine if results would be affected if the divorce rate were to be included in the main analyses. However, to avoid over-identification, we must exclude one existing control variable to 'make space' for adding the divorce rate. We chose to exclude the theoretically least convincing variable from our analysis, the Cold War dummy.

Table K presents the results. The findings are robust to the inclusion of the divorce rate.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
World War II	0.042										
	(0.047)										
Dummy: other wars	0.013										
	(0.019)										
Korea		0.047									
		(0.052)									
Dummy: other wars		0.013									
		(0.019)									
Vietnam			0.097*								
			(0.023)								
Dummy: other wars			0.001								
			(0.013)								
Lebanon				0.040*							
				(0.015)							
Dummy: other wars				0.022							
				(0.023)							
Dominican Republic					0.104*						
					(0.013)						
Dummy: other wars					0.017						
					(0.022)						
Panama						0.073*					
						(0.010)					
Dummy: other wars						0.021					
						(0.022)					
Gulf War							0.037				
							(0.027)				
Dummy: other wars							0.013				
							(0.019)				
Somalia								-0.152*			
								(0.049)			
Dummy: other wars								0.054*			
								(0.019)			
Haiti									-0.117*		
									(0.059)		
Dummy: other wars									0.045*		
									(0.020)		
Bosnia										-0.099	
										(0.064)	
Dummy: other wars										0.042*	
										(0.020)	
Kosovo											-0.053*
											(0.011)
Dummy: other wars											0.019
											(0.021)
Real income per capita	0.210	0.207	0.207	0.018	-0.014	0.026	0.201	0.190	0.228	0.146	0.156
	(0.306)	(0.319)	(0.440)	(0.322)	(0.319)	(0.321)	(0.315)	(0.311)	(0.311)	(0.321)	(0.311)
Unemployment rate	0.092	0.093	0.098	0.086	0.082	0.085	0.089	0.100	0.104	0.092	0.087
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.063)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Inflation	0.675*	0.653*	0.880*	0.672*	0.683*	0.650*	0.652*	0.712*	0.710*	0.690*	0.652*
	(0.232)	(0.241)	(0.233)	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.215)	(0.236)	(0.204)	(0.208)	(0.213)	(0.234)
Share of young population	-0.005	-0.004	-0.009*	-0.005	-0.006	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Welfare State assistance per capita	-0.031	-0.033	-0.037	-0.057	-0.050	-0.057	-0.034	-0.047	-0.043	-0.044	-0.034
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Divorce rate	0.220	0.230	0.279	0.333*	0.357*	0.332*	0.237	0.199	0.196	0.223	0.244
	(0.121)	(0.132)	(0.174)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.124)	(0.130)	(0.113)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.127)
Constant	0.030	0.018	0.090	0.043	0.057	0.041	0.026	0.031	0.020	0.039	0.034
	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.067)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.083)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.079)
AIC	-227.968	-228.104	-238.758	-221.755	-223.962	-222.515	-227.903	-235.457	-232.507	-231.587	-229.751
BIC	-201.7661	-201.9013	-205.4098	-200.3164	-202.5241	-201.0763	-201.7006	-209.2545	-206.3044	-205.3849	-203.5487

Table K. Robustness test controlling for the the status of moral norms in a society, operationalized by including the divorce rate. The findings are robust to the inclusion of this control variable. Standard Errors in parentheses. * $p<0.05$.

3.6 Omit control for Cold War

The main results include a control to account for the external security environment of the United States. Citizens' perception of a war's legitimacy might be shaped if it occurred within the context of the Cold War. We account for this by including a dummy set to one between 1947–1991, and zero in other years (Mitchell and Moore 2002). However, we recognize that this control has two limitations. First, it is a fairly crude measure of the international security environment and thus might lead to less, rather than more, accurate results. Second, the international security environment may not matter to individuals in the U.S. as their attention might be consumed by domestic worries. For this reason, there may be an argument to omit this control variable from the analysis.

To show that our findings do not depend on the inclusion of this dummy variable, we re-estimate our main models without this variable. Table L presents the results. The findings are robust to the omission of the Cold War period dummy.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
World War II	0.062										
	(0.051)										
Dummy: other wars	0.015										
	(0.019)										
Korea		0.059									
		(0.062)									
Dummy: other wars		0.015									
		(0.020)									
Vietnam			0.133*								
			(0.013)								
Dummy: other wars			0.009								
			(0.009)								
Lebanon				0.069*							
				(0.010)							
Dummy: other wars				0.032							
				(0.025)							
Dominican Republic					0.100*						
					(0.014)						
Dummy: other wars					0.029						
					(0.024)						
Panama						0.090*					
						(0.009)					
Dummy: other wars						0.032					
						(0.024)					
Gulf War							0.041				
							(0.028)				
Dummy: other wars							0.017				
							(0.020)				
Somalia								-0.159*			
								(0.056)			
Dummy: other wars								0.060*			
								(0.021)			
Haiti									-0.125*		
									(0.060)		
Dummy: other wars									0.052*		
									(0.022)		
Bosnia										-0.103	
										(0.071)	
Dummy: other wars										0.047*	
										(0.022)	
Kosovo											-0.045*
											(0.011)
Dummy: other wars											0.023
											(0.023)
Real income per capita	0.449	0.461	0.561*	0.418	0.413	0.424	0.462	0.427	0.457	0.405	0.425
	(0.248)	(0.256)	(0.240)	(0.272)	(0.271)	(0.272)	(0.256)	(0.254)	(0.247)	(0.262)	(0.256)
Unemployment rate	0.118*	0.120*	0.134*	0.132*	0.131*	0.130*	0.117*	0.126*	0.129*	0.120*	0.116*
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Inflation	0.652*	0.611*	0.816*	0.645*	0.647*	0.616*	0.609*	0.693*	0.691*	0.662*	0.609*
	(0.253)	(0.266)	(0.250)	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.223)	(0.262)	(0.220)	(0.225)	(0.233)	(0.261)
Share of young population	-0.002	-0.000	-0.005	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Welfare State assistance per capita	-0.036	-0.039	-0.054	-0.072*	-0.067*	-0.072*	-0.040	-0.051	-0.047	-0.049	-0.040
	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.038)
Constant	-0.024	-0.045	0.013	-0.045	-0.037	-0.045	-0.037	-0.019	-0.031	-0.017	-0.031
	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.032)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.086)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.082)
AIC	-227.247	-227.107	-245.898	-217.577	-218.624	-218.192	-226.673	-234.995	-232.236	-230.644	-228.287
BIC	-203.4271	-203.2864	-214.9318	-198.5211	-199.5677	-199.1357	-202.853	-211.1751	-208.4159	-206.8239	-204.467

Table L. Robustness test omitting the control variable for the Cold War. Our results are not affected by the omission of this variable. Standard Errors in parentheses. * $p<0.05$.

3.7 Treatment of other wars

No controls for wars The main results presented in Figure 2 and Table D use dummies to control for the effect of other wars on homicide rates. With these dummies, we intend to ensure that the coefficient estimates identify only the effect of the war in question: This is, at times, necessary, as the war years do overlap in a small number of cases. However, it is possible to argue that the ARIMA analysis is accounting for all pre-existent trends already, rendering such dummies unnecessary. To show that our results do not depend on the presence or absence of these dummies, Table M displays the results without these dummies. The results indicate that the substantive findings remain largely unchanged: Homicide rates increase after illegitimate wars, but not following legitimate wars.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
World War II	0.072										
	(0.054)										
Korea		0.041									
		(0.073)									
Vietnam			0.103*								
			(0.008)								
Lebanon				0.038*							
				(0.013)							
Dominican Republic					0.088*						
					(0.011)						
Panama						0.066*					
						(0.010)					
Gulf War							0.019				
							(0.022)				
Somalia								-0.039			
								(0.035)			
Haiti									-0.029		
									(0.033)		
Bosnia										-0.012	
										(0.048)	
Kosovo											-0.043*
											(0.008)
Real income per capita	0.459	0.471	0.184	0.412	0.407	0.420	0.468	0.454	0.458	0.456	0.440
	(0.253)	(0.266)	(0.249)	(0.281)	(0.279)	(0.280)	(0.269)	(0.271)	(0.270)	(0.271)	(0.272)
Unemployment rate	0.113*	0.114*	0.078	0.113*	0.113*	0.112*	0.110*	0.109*	0.109*	0.109*	0.108*
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Inflation	0.535*	0.492	0.271	0.445	0.459*	0.414	0.482	0.481	0.481	0.479	0.471
	(0.260)	(0.273)	(0.386)	(0.231)	(0.229)	(0.230)	(0.267)	(0.267)	(0.267)	(0.268)	(0.269)
Share of young population	-0.003	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Welfare State assistance per capita	-0.046	-0.048	-0.067	-0.087*	-0.080*	-0.087*	-0.049	-0.049	-0.049	-0.049	-0.049
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Cold War dummy	0.041*	0.034	0.022*	0.040*	0.039*	0.040*	0.035	0.035	0.036*	0.036	0.036
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Constant	-0.016	-0.042	-0.010	-0.033	-0.026	-0.035	-0.033	-0.025	-0.028	-0.029	-0.027
	(0.080)	(0.088)	(0.038)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.080)
AIC	-230.008	-228.493	-257.971	-220.171	-222.161	-221.101	-228.046	-228.491	-228.249	-227.950	-228.694
BIC	-206.1879	-204.6728	-227.0049	-201.1143	-203.1047	-202.0452	-204.2261	-204.6704	-204.4291	-204.1295	-204.8738

Table M. Robustness test omitting the control variables capturing the effect of wars other than the war under consideration. Our results are not affected by the omission of these controls. Standard Errors in parentheses. * $p<0.05$.

Differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate other wars As noted above, the main results presented in Figure 2 and Table D use dummies to control for the effect of other wars on homicide rates. However, by doing so, we estimate the effect of a single war in contrast to homicide rates of all other wars — legitimate or illegitimate. For this reason, we re-estimate our models while controlling for the effect of other wars, but this time differentiating between other legitimate and other illegitimate wars.

The numerical results are presented in Table N. The substantive interpretation remains largely unchanged, as illegitimate wars increase homicide rates while legitimate wars do not, even after adjusting the way in which we control for other wars.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
World War II	0.066										
	(0.035)										
Dummy: other legitimate wars	-0.012										
	(0.013)										
Dummy: other illegitimate wars	0.094*										
	(0.021)										
Korea		0.042									
		(0.035)									
Dummy: other legitimate wars		-0.005									
		(0.017)									
Dummy: other illegitimate wars		0.086*									
		(0.022)									
Vietnam			0.114*								
			(0.017)								
Dummy: other legitimate wars			-0.009								
			(0.013)								
Dummy: other illegitimate wars			0.066								
			(0.037)								
Lebanon				0.049*							
				(0.011)							
Dummy: other legitimate wars				-0.004							
				(0.016)							
Dummy: other illegitimate wars				0.100*							
				(0.014)							
Dominican Republic					0.060*						
					(0.011)						
Dummy: other legitimate wars					-0.004						
					(0.016)						
Dummy: other illegitimate wars					0.100*						
					(0.016)						
Panama						0.088*					
						(0.009)					
Dummy: other legitimate wars						-0.004					
						(0.016)					
Dummy: other illegitimate wars						0.094*					
						(0.014)					
Gulf War							0.058*				
							(0.013)				
Dummy: other legitimate wars							-0.006				
							(0.016)				
Dummy: other illegitimate wars							0.087*				
							(0.020)				
Somalia								-0.117*			
								(0.050)			
Dummy: other legitimate wars								0.033			
								(0.026)			
Dummy: other illegitimate wars								0.091*			
								(0.021)			
Haiti									-0.106*		
									(0.052)		
Dummy: other legitimate wars									0.024		
									(0.023)		
Dummy: other illegitimate wars									0.093*		
									(0.022)		
Bosnia										-0.062	
										(0.051)	
Dummy: other legitimate wars										0.017	
										(0.025)	
Dummy: other illegitimate wars										0.089*	
										(0.020)	
Kosovo											-0.066*
											(0.020)
Dummy: other legitimate wars											0.002
											(0.020)
Dummy: other illegitimate wars											0.089*
											(0.022)
Real income per capita	0.307	0.355	0.494	0.332	0.341	0.344	0.379	0.346	0.357	0.334	0.346
	(0.260)	(0.278)	(0.266)	(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.258)	(0.272)	(0.270)	(0.268)	(0.274)	(0.268)
Unemployment rate	0.116*	0.119*	0.133*	0.112*	0.115*	0.116*	0.116*	0.118*	0.120*	0.115*	0.115*
	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Inflation	0.717*	0.672*	0.735*	0.685*	0.689*	0.694*	0.669*	0.693*	0.700*	0.683*	0.677*
	(0.200)	(0.220)	(0.224)	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.206)	(0.212)	(0.204)	(0.200)	(0.209)	(0.212)
Share of young population	-0.005	-0.003	-0.005	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Welfare State assistance per capita	-0.069	-0.071	-0.054	-0.082*	-0.086*	-0.083*	-0.074*	-0.071	-0.075	-0.072*	-0.074
	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.041)
Constant	0.020	-0.014	0.011	0.007	-0.000	0.001	-0.007	-0.005	-0.007	-0.001	0.001
	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.034)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.060)
AIC	-235.677	-233.453	-242.045	-236.784	-236.406	-235.929	-233.893	-236.132	-235.101	-233.742	-234.073
BIC	-209.4747	-207.2506	-208.6964	-215.3461	-214.968	-214.4907	-207.6907	-209.9299	-208.899	-207.54	-207.8705

Table N. Robustness test including control variables capturing the effect of wars other than the war under consideration — but differentiating between 'other legitimate' and 'other illegitimate' wars. Our results are not affected by differentiating between different types of other wars. Standard Errors in parentheses. * $p<0.05$.

4 Changes in the definition of the war intervention

4.1 Different end dates of wars

The analyses presented above define the intervention period as the time between the U.S. entry into a war and the U.S. exit from a war. However, the brutalization effect is unlikely to suddenly stop immediately once troops are withdrawn: Media coverage of the war will not cease immediately after a war, soldiers might return home only after the war has officially concluded, and public discussion of the war will continue for some time after its official end. As a result, it is possible to argue that the intervention period for our models should be defined as several years after the war's end.

Against this background, we conduct a number of additional analyses. For each war, we re-define the intervention to end not with the official U.S. exit from a war, but several years after the exit. Specifically, we add up to five years to the intervention analysis.[5]

Due to the large number of analyses, we summarize the findings graphically. Figure C summarizes the findings for all illegitimate wars. The findings suggest that including additional years after the conclusion of the war generally does not change the results for Vietnam and the Dominican Republics. However, if we add additional years to the analysis of the wars in Lebanon and Panama, we find a statistically significant effect for the first two years after the war, but not thereafter. This makes sense, considering the smaller scale of these illegitimate wars. Overall, however, illegitimate wars do increase homicide rates, even years after their conclusion.

In contrast, legitimate wars do not affect homicide rates. As shown in Figure D, including additional years after the conclusion of legitimate wars generally does not change the results.

[5]We want to point out that this might not be ideal. After all, by extending the intervention period to include 1–5 additional years after the war ended, some intervention periods might now overlap.



Note: Figure illustrates how changes to the definition of when a war ended affects results obtained for illegitimate wars. For example, Vietnam war has a positive and significant effect even if the 'end' of the war is extended from its 'real' date in 1973 to 1978, reflecting the amount of controversy this war continued to create even years after its conclusion. In contrast, changing the definition of smaller wars such as Lebanon and Panama yields different results: Extending the 'end' date by more than two years yields insignificant results. This change in effect over time is likely due to the smaller scale of these wars, which are less obviously dominating public debate several years after conclusion.

Figure C. Effect of illegitimate wars



Note: Figure illustrates how changes to the definition of when a war ended affects results obtained for legitimate wars. For example, World War II continues to have an insignificant effect on homicide rates even if the 'end' of the war is extended from its 'real' date in 1945 to 1950. In almost all cases, changing the definition of when a war 'ended' does not change results for other legitimate wars either. Importantly, unlike with illegitimate wars (see Figure C, no systematic differences exist between major and minor wars.

Figure D. Effect of legitimate wars

4.2 Vietnam intervention with different dates

It might be the case that the extent to which Americans viewed wars as legitimate clearly changed over time. This is particularly applicable when considering the longer wars. The longest war in our sample is Vietnam, which lasted for almost 20 years. However, it might be argued that most U.S. citizens were not even aware of the fact that the U.S. was engaged in Vietnam until particularly memorable events were publicized. Examples might include Kennedy's troop escalation in 1961, Johnson's troop escalation beginning in 1963, or the Tet offensive in 1968. Similarly, highly publicized critical events, such as Russell's International War Crimes Tribunal held in 1967, might have alerted individuals who previously did not pay much attention to the war.

Yet, our analysis treats the time period between 1955 and 1973 as if it is the same as the stretch of the war that ran from the mid-60s into the early 70s. Against this background, we estimate five additional models. In each model, we define the Vietnam war with shorter time periods. The findings are summarized in Figure E. The results are robust to changing the definition of when the Vietnam war might have been noticed.



Note: Figure illustrates the changes in effect size if the definition of the 'start' date for Vietnam War is changed. Whatever the definition of the start date, however, the Vietnam War is always associated with an increase in the homicide rates. For instance, if the beginning of the Vietnam War is defined by Kennedy's first troop escalation in 1961, rather than its official start in 1955, the effect is still positive and statistically significant.

Figure E. Changing the definition of the Vietnam War starting date

5 List of Wars

	U.S. Entry	U.S. Exit	Official Begin	Official End
World War II	1941	1945	1939	1945
Korean War	1950	1953	1950	1953
Vietnam War	1955	1973	1955	1975
Lebanon	1958	1958	1958	1958
Dominican Republic	1965	1965	1965	1965
Grenada	1983	1983	1983	1983
Panama	1989	1990	1989	1990
Gulf War	1990	1991	1990	1991
Somalia	1993	1995	1990	(none)
Haiti	1994	1995	1994	1995
Bosnia	1992	1995	1992	1995
Kosovo	1998	1999	1998	1999

Table O. List of wars included in this study. Note, we use the dates the United States entered and exited a war (rather than the full duration of a war) to measure whether international war affects domestic homicide rates in the United States.

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