systems work without any human input and are used in unmanmed aerial vehicles (UAVs; p. 106).

Most readers will find these examples highly relevant and probably know something about the related ethical controversies surrounding them. Although Bousquet's work is not a direct intervention into these debates, his historical account puts these developments into context, making it possible to identify the unique features of today's most sophisticated systems. We are now imagining systems of visual representation that are not bound by a screen (p. 113) and are able to depict a three-dimensional virtual reality that dissolves the boundary between human beings and technology. Bousquet shows how new technology (which we might associate with cutting-edge computer games) is able to merge human perception with machine sensory depiction. For example, one of the most interesting technologies is a helmet for pilots that could track eye movement and hand gestures, as well as creating a "virtual cockpit" that would present not only different images of the immediate surroundings but also a threat warning system or terrain maps. However, this "Super Cockpit program never did reach fruition" (p. 117) and thus serves as only one of many examples in this book of failing technology. Throughout the book Bousquet gives examples of visionary technologies that were not implemented, thereby emphasizing that the development of technology is never as linear as we might think.

In Chapter 4, "Mapping," Bousquet focuses on the ever more precise techniques of mapping and how we can understand maps not only as a representation of reality but also as a social production of space. Today digital maps are also a "communication channel" and "cognitive enabler" (p. 143). Not only (but especially) in the military, maps are crucial technologies for orientation in the world. Bousquet discusses critically important geographers but also emphasizes the instrumental function of maps (p. 121). Maps can be "better" or "worse" for providing orientation. This seems like an obvious point, but critical scholars of technology tend to play down the instrumental function of technology in their attempts to problematize its impact.

The last substantive chapter, "Hiding," takes the previous empirical examination to its logical conclusion by examining techniques of camouflage. Although it makes sense to conclude with a chapter of counterstrategies, this chapter lacks the technical focus and details that make the other chapters more accessible. Bousquet describes different techniques of camouflage and highlights the influence of scientists and artists in their development. Here it becomes clear that many gaps in our knowledge about visual perception remain and that the science of camouflage is not understood completely yet.

The conclusion further develops the idea that technological development and the conduct of warfare are not only linked but also what this can tell us about politics more generally. Processes of targeting and identifying are also processes of subjectification (p. 196). Where the classical political subject was a result of centralized forms of observation, today the object of targeting practices is also always its subject (p. 197). With this final chapter, Bousquet opens up the way to embed his empirical analysis in the broader development of the revolution in military affairs and the general societal effects of digitization that were hinted at in previous chapters. One wishes this part would have been developed more, because it would have allowed for a deeper understanding of perception technology from a political sociological point of view that takes seriously questions of subjectivation, power, and order. Overall, this book will be of interest not only to scholars of critical military studies but also researchers interested in the history of visual technology and the technologization of security more generally.

Raise the Debt: How Developing Countries Choose Their Creditors. By Jonas B. Bunte. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. 294p. $99.00 cloth, $29.95 paper.
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Credit and debt are essential to economic development and modern governance. As a result, the variables that affect a state's ability to borrow and the consequences of excessive borrowing are the subject of broad academic literatures in economics and political economy. Yet, scholars have had a blind spot in their approach to understanding the acquisition of debt. It was conventional, but untested, wisdom that all states had a similar preference ranking for the creditors from whom they would borrow. Private creditors, from banks or through bond issuances, are thought most preferred because their loans come with few strings attached and states are free to use the raised funds in any way they see fit. However, when states were deemed too risky and the cost of borrowing from private creditors was too high, they could potentially turn to official lenders, such as the IMF or World Bank, or bilateral loans for finance. However, as we know, these loans come with varying levels of policy concessions that can limit a government's autonomy, or they are dedicated to funding a particular infrastructure project. Given these assumptions, the pairing of creditors and debtors was largely assumed to be a supply-side phenomenon dictated by the availability of private credit and the willingness of official lenders to engage with a particular country.

Jonas Bunte questions this conventional wisdom in *Raise the Debt*. His central contribution is the argument that the pairing of creditors and debtors is also driven by domestic politics in borrowing states. In other words, both demand-side and supply-side dynamics are at work in this process. To develop a framework for understanding the demand-side dynamics, Bunte applies the Open Economy Politics (OEP) toolkit to theorize about which domestic interest groups are the winners and losers of four types of external finance: private creditors, international financial institutions (IFIs), bilateral loans from Western states, and bilateral loans from either Brazil, Russia, India, or China (BRICs). He then theorizes that these preferences for different creditors will determine which financing strategies are most likely when these groups are part of a governing coalition. Bunte comes to several conclusions about the character of such ruling coalitions and their preferred creditors. First, corporatist coalitions (when labor and industry interest groups share power) prefer borrowing from BRICs. This is because labor is opposed to the conditionality of official loans from IFIs and industry benefits from the subcontracting from infrastructure projects that are commonly funded by bilateral loans. Second, consumer coalitions of labor and finance interest groups have a strong preference for bilateral loans from Western states, which generally emphasize social expenditure that benefits labor and come with good governance requirements that help impose macroeconomic discipline that aligns with financial industry interests. Last, a capital coalition of finance and industry has a strong preference for private sector loans and a weak preference for IFI loans given their strong conditionality that may reduce inflation and improve competitiveness.

Before starting his quantitative test of the theory with observational data, Bunte presents a plethora of interview evidence from three detailed case studies that serve to test his assumptions about the preferences of various interest groups. He should be lauded for his mixed-methods approach to testing the theory, which is rare in contemporary research. Interviews of government representatives and nonstate business actors in Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru show that, by and large, the preferences of these interest groups align with the theoretical expectations. Further, the case study evidence is also useful for demonstrating that states often do reject a method of finance such as private credit, even though it may be preferred, for options that might have previously been considered undesirable by comparison, such as IFI borrowing.

The book's quantitative analysis is equally impressive. Bunte generates innovative measures to capture the size and strength of the corporatists, consumer, and capital coalitions described in his theory and demonstrates that, when different coalitions are in power, the source of borrowed funds change and do so largely in accordance with the theory.

This book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of government financing decisions. As such, its argument has implications not only for contexts where we are likely to see different types of borrowing but also, by extension, where we are likely to see the consequences of those different types of borrowing. For example, it gives us a better idea of which countries select IMF/WB lending, thereby enabling more accurate predictions of its effect on various outcomes. Perhaps most notably, the book gives us a better idea of how states will respond to the new competition posted by BRICs in official lending. Bunte's analysis and evidence provide a solid foundation for understanding why some countries select BRICS, whereas others are happy to select Western lenders or eschew bilateral lending altogether. Scholars will now have to account for these demand-side factors when addressing issues of borrowing in future research.

Despite the book's large contribution, some limitations need to be addressed. First, to derive interest group preferences for private credit (from either bonds or private banks), the book relies primarily on the costs each group would likely pay in the event of default (nonpayment). Default, although the topic of much research, is still a rare experience for most citizens. Thus, the significant costs of default are not a risk that most interest groups consider in the initial decision to borrow from private creditors. Further, these potential costs can come due quite far in the future, and it is likely that interest groups discount these potential future costs when weighing the choice among different options. The ambiguity regarding preferences for private sector lending is also apparent in the quantitative evidence, because the relationship between coalition strength and the private sector is not as strong as it is for demarcating differences in preferences for BRIC or IFI borrowing. As some of the interview evidence suggests, it may be that private credit remains supreme, at least when borrowing costs are reasonable, and that interest groups have the most important say in the decision of which official lending channel that states choose. Still, the book provides valuable information about the preferences across many other sources of credit and will serve as an indispensable contribution for scholars addressing the causes and consequence of sovereign lending.

Distant Justice: The Impact of the International Criminal Court on African Politics. By Phil Clark. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 392p. $105.00 cloth, $34.99 paper.
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Over the past decade, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has increasingly faced accusations of being "in crisis." Challenges range from its contentious relationship with several African countries and the African Union, mistakes at trial made by the Office of the Prosecutor, to a lack of state cooperation and the absence of investigations against Western powers. Phil Clark's well-written and logically structured book helps explain these challenges, by arguing that it is the Court's insistence on "distant justice"